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After law school, not all attorneys begin their practices m law firms.'
Approximately ten percent of attorneys pursue legal careers as ,m-house
counsel for corporations.2 Because corporate attorneys each represent only
one client - the corporation - they often face conflicts between their roles
as professionals and their roles as corporate employees.3 This conflict
appears most evident when dismissed corporate counsel wish to pursue
actions for retaliatory discharge4 against their former employers.
* The author expresses her appreciation to Chris Terrell, Mike Bosh, and Professor
Doug Rendleman for their assistance in the development of this Note. The author extends a
special thanks to Phil Nichols for his support, encouragement, and excellent editing skills.
1. See Nancy K. Renfer, Comment, Corporate Counsels' Lack of Retaliatory Dis-
charge Action, 10N. ILL. U. L. REV 89, 89-90 n.5 (1989) (providing statistics that show that
29.8 % of attorneys work in fields other than private practice).
2. See Jeff Barge, For In-House Counsel, Safety in Numbers, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1995,
at 28 (according to Fred Krebs, president of American Corporate Counsel Association)
(stating that for past 20 years, in-house counsel have comprised approximately 10% of
practicing attorneys). For the purposes of this Note, the terms in-house counsel, rn-house
attorney, corporate counsel, and corporate attorney are interchangeable.
3. See Grace M. Giesel, The Ethics or Employment Dilemma of In-House Counsel, 5
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 535, 535-37 (1992) (discussing conflicts between in-house counsel's
loyalty to client and duty to uphold ethical obligations); Raymis H.C. Kim, Note, In-House
Counsel's Wrongful Discharge Action Under the Public Policy Exception and Retaliatory
Discharge Doctnne, 67 WASH. L. REv 893, 909 (1992) (discussing conflict between in-house
attorney's duty to uphold ethical rules and personal desire to retain job); see also Nordling
v Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Minn. 1991) (recognizing rn-house
attorney's dual roles of attorney and corporate employee).
4. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (defining retaliatory discharge); see
also infra part III.B (discussing emergence of retaliatory discharge action).
992 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV 991 (1995)
In most jurisdictions, corporate employees who are not attorneys
can sue their employers for retaliatory discharge.5 Some commentators
argue that courts should give rn-house counsel the same legal options as
other corporate employees and should allow corporate attorneys to bring
retaliatory discharge tort actions. 6 Several courts, however, have distm-
guished between rn-house attorneys and other corporate employees.7
Because attorneys are professionals, they have rights and duties that other
corporate employees lack.' The courts that have considered this issue
have declined to extend the retaliatory discharge tort action to rn-house
counsel because the courts fear that such actions could jeopardize the
trust and confidence of the attorney-client relationship. 9 These courts
5. See infra note 76 (listing jurisdictions that recognize public policy exception to
employment at-will doctrine).
6. See, e.g., Daniel S. Reynolds, Wrongful Discharge of Employed Counsel, 1 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 553, 553 (1988) (arguing that courts should extend protection afforded by
wrongful discharge action to lawyers); Sara A. Corello, Note, In-House Counsel's Right to
Sue for Retaliatory Discharge, 92 COLUM. L. REv 389, 389 (1992) (asserting that courts
should allow in-house counsel to bring retaliatory discharge actions); Kim, supra note 3, at
894-95 (same); Renfer, supra note 1, at 92 (same).
7 See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F Supp. 116, 118 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (emphasizing
attorneys' ethical responsibilities that other company employees lack), rev'd for lack of
federal jurisdiction, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); Balla v Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104,
108 (111. 1991) (emphasizing attorney's duty of confidentiality and other ethical consider-
ations); Herbster v North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 346 (ill. App.
Ct. 1986) (stating that attorneys hold special position in society), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d
728 (Ill.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 478
N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 1991) (stating that breach of attorney-client confidentiality is likely
to occur in retaliatory discharge actions, but allowing breach of contract claim); Michaelson
v Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174, 178 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (emphasiz-
ing that client has unfettered right to dismiss attorney in order to preserve relationship of trust
with attorney), aftd, 479 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992); McGonagle v Union Fidelity Corp., 556
A.2d 878, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (recognizing obligation of in-house attorney to abide by
state laws and ethical rules), appeal denied, 575 A.2d 115 (Pa. 1990).
8. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1992) (discussing various
responsibilities of attorneys); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1983)
(same).
9 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992) (requiring preser-
vation of client confidences); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101
(1983) (same). See generally Willy v Coastal Corp., 647 F Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986)
(rejecting retaliatory discharge tort to preserve client confidences), rev'dfor lack offederal
jurisdiction, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); Balla v Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (II.
1991) (same); Herbster v North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986) (same), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (II1.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987);
Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991) (same).
RETALIATORYDISCHARGE FOR IN-HOUSE ATTORNEYS 993
reason that the tort of retaliatory discharge places client confidences at
risk. "
II. A Brief Explanation of the Employment At-Will Doctrine"
From the beginning, American employment law borrowed principles
from English law 12 The Statute of Labourers 3 influenced English employ-
ment law by giving masters a property interest in their servants.14 Because
of this property interest, employees were required to remain with their,
employers until the end of the term of employment. 15
During the nineteenth century, England redefined the concepts of master
and servant and developed the presumption in English employment law that
employment for an unspecified term lasted one year.' 6 This rule sought to
provide fairness both to employers and to employees. " Inequity would have
10. See cases cited supra note 7 (refusing to allow in-house attorneys to bring retaliatory
discharge tort actions).
11. See ANDREW D. HILL, "WRONGFUL DISCHARGE" AND THE DEROGATION OF THE AT-
WILLEMPLOYMENTDOCTRINE 1-12 (WhartonoIndustrial Research Unit Labor Relations and
Public Policy Series No. 31, 1987) (providing historical discussion of employment at-will
doctrine); IRAM. SHEPARD Er AL., WITHOUT JUST CAUSE: AN EMPLOYER'S PRACTICAL AND
LEGAL GUIDE ON WRONGFUL DISCHARGE 16-18 (1989) (tracing development of employment
at-will doctrine); Joseph DeGiuseppe, Jr., The Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on
Employee Rights to Job Secunty and Fnnge Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1, 2-8 (1981)
(same); Jay M. Femman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118, 118-35 (1976) (providing thorough discussion of employment at-will doctrine);
Sanford M. Jacoby, The Duration of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States and
England: An Historcal Analysis, 5 COMP LAB. L. 85, 85-128 (1982) (providing extensive
comparison between development of English and American employment law).
12. See Femman, supra note 11, at 118 (discussing development of at-will employment
doctrine in United States).
13. See 5 Eliz., ch. 4, § 5 (1562) (Eng.) (stating that no servant could leave employ-
ment before end of term), repealed by Conspiracy and Protection of Property Act, 38 & 39
Vict., ch. 86, § 17 (1875) (Eng.); Statute of Labourers, 1349, 23 Edw. 3, ch. 2 (Eng.)
(stating that government would imprison employee if employee left service of employer
without reasonable cause before term of employment ended).
14. See Jacoby, supra note 11, at 87 (stating that English statutory law viewed servants
as property).
15. See sources cited supra note 13 (providing English statutory law on employment
termination); see also Jacoby, supra note 11, at 87 (stating that government could compel
servant, who left master's service before end of term, to complete term of service).
16. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425.
17 Id., see Femman, supra note 11, at 120 (stating that employers and employees
derived benefits from each other at different points in employment relationship); Jacoby,
supra note 11, at 90 (stating that equity, along with labor shortage, led to development of
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resulted if employers could have retained workers only during the harvest
seasons and then discharged the workers to avoid compensating them during
the off-season."8 Similarly, employers would have suffered financially if
employees could have received wages during the winter and then quit their
jobs immediately before the busy harvest season.' 9 Although the English
rule of employment for one year developed originally to protect those
involved m harvesting,' courts expanded the rule to apply to workers in all
employment fields.2 As the variety of employment opportunities increased,
English law began to allow parties to terminate employment relationships
after giving adequate notice.22
At the end of the nineteenth century, American law departed from the
English rule of yearly employment and developed the at-will employment
doctrmeY Employment at-will arose in the United States as a result of this
country's commitment to individual enterprise and to free markets during the
Industrial Revolution.24 As industry m the United States expanded, employ-
yearly hiring).
18. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425; see Femman, supra note 11, at
120 (explaining development of yearly hiring rule in context of harvesting); Jacoby, supra
note 11, at 90 (discussing need for year-long employment).
19 See sources cited supra note 18 (discussing yearly hiring rule).
20. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425; see Femman, supra note 11, at
120 (discussing origins of yearly hiring doctrine).
21. See Baxter v Nurse, 134 Eng. Rep. 1171, 1173 (C.P 1844) (extending rule of
employment for one year to editor of literary publication); Beeston v Collyer, 130 Eng. Rep.
786, 787-88 (C.P 1827) (extending rule of employment for one year to clerk of army
sergeant); CHARLES M. SMITH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 41 (1852)
(stating that yearly employment rule extended to domestic workers, clerks, and others);
Feinman, supra note 11, at 120 (explaining expansion of yearly hiring rule).
22. See Payzu, Ltd. v Hannaford, [1918] 2 K.B. 348, 350 (stating that party must give
reasonable notice prior to termination of employment); FRANCIS BATT, THE LAW OF MASTER
AND SERVANT 63-64 (George J. Webber ed., 5th ed. 1967) (discussing appropriate notice);
1 WILUAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *425-26 (stating that party could terminate yearly
hiring on quarter's notice); DeGiuseppe, supra note 11, at 5 (stating that party could
terminate employment relationship only by notice in accordance with custom of trade or by
reasonable notice); Femman, supra note 11, at 121 (stating that party could terminate service
contract upon reasonable notice).
23. See DANIEL M. MACKEY, EMPLOYMENT AT WILL AND EMPLOYER LIABILITY 10
(1986) (stating that changes in American society led to development of employment at-will
rule); Femman, supra note 11, at 122 (discussing American divergence from English law);
William L. Mauk, Wrongful Discharge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21
IDAHO L. REV 201, 203 (1985) (stating that employment at-will doctrine was departure from
English common law).
24. See MACKEY, supra note 23, at 10 (discussing impact of Industrial Revolution on
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ees wanted the opportunity to seek various employment opportunities, 2
while employers wanted flexibility m structuring their work forces to adapt
to the changing economy '
The at-will employment doctrine, by definition, allows both employers
and employees to terminate the employment relationship at any time and for
any reason.' The doctrine often applies to a relationship between an er-
employment at-will doctrine); SHEPARD ET AL., supra note 11, at 16 (same); Roger C.
Cramton, The Lawyer as Wistleblower: Confidentiality and the Government Lawyer, 5 GEo.
J. LEGALETHICS 291, 306 (1991) (stating that employment at-will doctrine arose as result of
American society's commitment to individual enterprise and free markets); Femman, supra
note 11, at 124 (discussing influence of laissez faire economic and political doctrine on
development of employment at-will); see also HORACE G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877) (setting forth presumption of employment at-will
rule). Horace Wood declared, without adequate foundation, that employment at-will was the
American employment rule. See Feinman, supra note 11, at 126 (stating that Wood failed
to cite cases that supported his proposition, misstated other American case law, and
incorrectly summarized state of prevailing English rule). Even though Wood's scholarship
proved inaccurate, courts across the United States accepted his statement of the employment
at-will rule. Id.
25. See Pitcher v United Oil & Gas Syndicate, Inc., 139 So. 760, 761 (La. 1932)
(stating that employee never enters permanent employment contract because employee must
retain opportuity to seek better employment); DANIEL P WESTMAN, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE
LAW OF RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 4 (1991) (providing rationale for employment at-will rule).
26. See WESTMAN, supra note 25, at 4 (providing rationale for employment at-will
rule).
27 See Somers v. Cooley Chevrolet Co., 153 A.2d 426, 428 (Conn. 1959) (concluding
that indefinite general hiring agreement is terminable at-will by either party); Fisher v
Jackson, 118 A.2d 316, 317 (Conn. 1955) (finding that without consideration in addition to
services provided, employment is actually indefinite general hiring that is terminable at-will);
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983) (stating that hiring for
indefinite term constitutes employment at-will); English v College of Medicine & Dentistry,
372 A.2d 295, 297 (N.J. 1977) (upholding exercise of at-will employment doctrine);
Hartbarger v Frank Paxton Co., 857 P.2d 776, 779 (N.M. 1993) (stating that employment
for indefinite term is terminable at-will), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1068 (1994); Murphy v
American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y 1983) (stating that employment for
indefinite term is presumed to be employment at-will); Martin v New York Life Ins. Co.,
42 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895) (stating that employment for unspecified term is employment
at-will, regardless of agreement to pay salary at specific intervals); Jones v Keogh, 409 A.2d
581, 582 (Vt. 1979) (accepting that employer or employee may terminate at-will employment
agreement for any reason); Wilder v Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211,
217 (Wyo. 1994) (allowing either party to terminate at-will employment arrangement for any
reason); Lincoln v Wackenhut Corp., 867 P.2d 701, 703 (Wyo. 1994) (same); WESTMAN,
supra note 25, at 4 (providing overview of at-will employment); see also Coelho v Posi-Seal
Int'l, Inc., 544 A.2d 170, 176 (Conn. 1988) (stating that general rule is that contracts for
indefinite term are terminable at-will); Monge v Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551
(N.H. 1974) (stating that at common law, employment contracts for indefinite term are
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ployer and an employee in the absence of a written employment agreement.
2
1
If an employment agreement does exist, but fails to specify a definite
duration, then a presumption arises that the employment exists at-will.2 An
presumed to be at-will); Jorgensen v Pennsylvania R.R., 138 A.2d 24, 32 (N.J. 1958)
(stating that in absence of contract or statute to contrary, employment relationship is
terminable at-will); Schlenk v Lehigh Valley R.R., 62 A.2d 380, 381 (N.J. 1948) (same);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 & cmt. a (1958) (codifying employment at-will
doctrine). Section 442 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency states: "[Uinless otherwise
agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to employ and to serve create obligations to
employ and to serve which are terminable upon notice by either party; if neither party
terminates the employment, it may terminate by lapse of time or by supervening events." Id.
§ 442.
28. See WESTMAN, supra note 25, at 4 (explaining characteristics of employment at-
will); Cramton, supra note 24, at 306 (affirming that under employment at-will relationship,
employers and employees may terminate employment relationship at any time absent express
agreement to contrary); see also 9 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACTS § 1017 at 129-30 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1967 & Supp. 1994) (stating that
if contract does not provide fixed term, either party may terminate contract at-will with no
required notice period).
29. See Somers v. Cooley Chevrolet Co., 153 A.2d 426, 428 (Conn. 1959) (concluding
that indefinite general hiring agreement is terminable at-will by either party); Fisher v
Jackson, 118 A.2d 316, 317 (Conn. 1955) (finding that without consideration in addition
to services provided, employment is actually indefinite general hiring that is terminable at-
will); Simard v Resolution Trust Corp., 639 A.2d 540, 551 (D.C. 1994) (stating that gen-
eral presumption of at-will employment exists when employment is for indefinite term); Rood
v General Dynamics Corp., 507 N.W.2d 591, 597 (Mich. 1993) (finding presumption of at-
will employment in contract for indefinite duration); Pine River State Bank v Mettille,
333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn. 1983) (stating that hiring for indefinite term constitutes
employment at-will); English v College of Medicine & Dentistry, 372 A.2d 295, 297 (N.J.
1977) (upholding exercise of at-will employment doctrine); Murphy v American Home
Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y 1983) (stating that employment for indefinite term
is presumed to be employment at-will); Martin v New York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416,
417 (N.Y 1895) (stating that employment for unspecified term is employment at-will,
regardless of agreement to pay salary at specific intervals); Ostermar-Levitt v MedQuest,
Inc., 513 N.W.2d 70, 72 (N.D. 1994) (presuming that employment agreement for indefinite
term is terminable at-will); Halpin v LaSalle Univ., 639 A.2d 37, 38 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994)
(stating that presumption of at-will employment exists); WILLISTON, supra note 28, § 1017,
at 129 (stating that contract for indefinite term is terminable at-will); WOOD, supra note 24,
§ 134 (stating that presumption of at-will employment exists); see also Coelho v Posi-Seal
Int'l, Inc., 544 A.2d 170, 176 (Conn. 1988) (stating that general rule is that contracts for
indefinite term are terminable at-will); Monge v Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551
(N.H. 1974) (stating that, at common law, employment contracts for indefinite term are
presumed to be at-will); Jorgensen v Pennsylvania R.R., 138 A.2d 24, 32 (N.J. 1958)
(stating that in absence of contract or statute to contrary, employment relationship is
terminable at-will); Schlenk v Lehigh Valley R.R., 62 A.2d 380, 381 (N.J. 1948) (same);
Jones v Keogh, 409 A.2d 581, 582 (Vt. 1979) (accepting employment at-will doctrine);
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early Tennessee case, Payne v Western & Atlantic Railroad,3° capsulized the
employment at-will doctrine. The court stated:
[Mien must be left, without interference to discharge or retain
employe[e]s at will for good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause
without thereby being guilty of an unlawful act per se. It is a right which
an employe[e] may exercise m the same way, to the same extent, for the
same cause or want of cause as the employer.3
In Adair v United States,32 the United States Supreme Court, in 1908,
analyzed the constitutional implications of the employment at-will doctrine
in situations involving interstate commerce. 3 The Supreme Court examined
SHEPARD ET AL., supra note 11, at 16 (tracing development of employment at-wiJI);
WtsTMAN, supra note 25, at 4 (providing overview of at-will employment). But cf. Toussaint
v Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Mich. 1980) (stating that general rule
that hirings for indefinite term are terminable at-will is merely rule of construction rather
than substantive limitation on enforceability of contract); supra note 24 (criticizing Wood's
scholarship).
30. 81 Tenn. 507 (1884).
31. Payne v Western & Ad. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19 (1884). In Payne, the
Tennessee Supreme Court considered whether a person or a business may threaten to
discharge employees for trading with a particular merchant. Id. at 517 Payne owned and
operated a store that was located at the junction of five railroad lines. Id. at 509 Many
railroad employees traded with Payne. Id. Payne contended that the defendant railroad
conspired to damage his business. Id. at 509-10. The railroad allegedly harmed Payne by
posting an illegal order and commanding company employees not to trade with Payne. Id.
at 510. Among other things, the railroad threatened to discharge any employees who traded
with Payne. Id. at 511. The court explained that the permissibility of the railroad's behavior
depended on the types of contracts that the employees possessed. Id. at 517 For example,
if a railroad employed an employee for a fixed term and discharged the employee prior to the
expiration of that term, then the employee could bring an action against the railroad for
breach of contract. Id. However, if the employment contract was terminable at-will, then
the employee could bring no action against the railroad because either party could terminate
the employment relationship for any reason. Id. The Payne court stated further that if the
railroad drove away Payne's customers and destroyed his business through threats and
intimidations, then the railroad was liable to Payne in damages. Id. at 521. However, the
court cautioned that "threats and intimidations" must be understood in their legal sense. Id.
The court defined a threat as a declaration of an intention to injure a person through an illegal
act, while an intimidation causes a person to fear such a declaration. Id. Because the act of
discharging railroad employees for transacting business with Payne was not unlawful, the
railroad's threats to take that action were not threats in law and therefore did not give rise to
Payne's claim. Id. Because the railroad committed no legal wrong, the court concluded that
Payne was not entitled to a remedy for the railroad's acts. Id. at 527
32. 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
33. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 172-76 (1908) (finding that statute prohibit-
ing employer from discharging at-will employees based on labor organization membership
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the Fifth Amendment's protection of liberty and determined that the
provision allowed individuals to contract freely without government
interference.34 Six years later, in Coppage v Kansas,35 the Supreme Court
extended the protection of the employment at-will doctnne to the states by
declaring that the Fourteenth Amendment protected the freedom of
contract.36 The Supreme Court, both in Adair and in. Coppage, concluded
invaded employer's Fifth Amendment liberty and property rights); accord Coppage v Kan-
sas, 236 U.S. 111 (1915) (finding that statute prohibiting employer from discharging at-will
employees based on labor organization membership invaded employer's Fourteenth Amend-
ment liberty and property rights); see also Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905)
(interpreting Constitution to support freedom of contract between employer and employee).
In Adair, the U.S. Supreme Court examined whether Congress could declare it a &mminal of-
fense for an agent of an interstate carrier to discharge an employee because of his member-
ship m a labor organization. Adair, 208 U.S. at 171. Congress passed a statute that prohib-
ited common carriers from requiring their employees to pledge not to join labor organiza-
tions. Id. at 168-69. According to the statute, carriers who violated the statute by dismissing
employees or by threatening to dismiss employees who joined labor organizations committed
a misdemeanor. Id. Adair worked as an agent of the Louisville and Nashville Railroad while
Coppage worked as an employee of the railroad. Id. at 170. The relationship between the
parties thus fell within the congressional statute. Id. Coppage belonged to a labor organiza-
tion. Id. In contravention of the statute, Adair discharged Coppage from his employment
because of Coppage's membership in the labor organization. Id. The Court examined wheth-
er the Fifth Amendment prohibited the enforcement of this statute. Id. at 172. The Court
concluded that the statute invaded the personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment because this liberty includes the right to make contracts involving
one's own labor. Id. Employers and employees have reciprocal rights to end their
employment relationship. Id. at 175. Employees may quit their employment for any reason,
just as employers may dismiss employees for any reason, absent specified discharge
provisions in the employment contract. Id. at 174-75. Thus, the Court held that Adair, as
an agent for the railroad, could discharge Coppage for any reason and that the Fifth
Amendment protected Adair's conduct. Id. at 176.
34. Adair, 208 U.S. at 175-76.
35. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
36. Coppage v Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 11 (1915) (finding that statute prohibiting
employer from discharging at-will employees based on labor'organization membership
invaded employer's Fourteenth Amendment liberty and property rights); accord Adair v
United States, 28 U.S. 161, 180 (finding that statute prohibiting employer from discharging
at-will employees based on labor organization membership invaded employer's Fifth
Amendment liberty and property rights); see also Lochner v New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53
(1905) (interpreting Constitution to support freedom of contract between employer and
employee). In Coppage, the U.S. Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a
state statute that declared it a misdemeanor for employers to require employees to give up
membership in a labor union or agree not to join a union while working for the employer.
Coppage, 236 U.S. at 6-7 Hedges, a switchman for the St. Louis & San Francisco Railway,
belonged to a labor union. Id. at 7 Coppage, the railway superintendent, asked Hedges
to sign an agreement to withdraw from the union. Id. Coppage also stated that if Hedges
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that either an employer or an employee may terminate an at-will employ-
ment relationship at any time and for any reason." Thus, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Constitution to support employment at-will and to
allow employers and employees great freedom both in contracting for and
in terminating their employment relationships. 8
Over time, courts created exceptions to the at-will employment doc-
trine. 9 A wrongful discharge plaintiff must fall withm one of these excep-
tions to recover damages for his dismissal.40 Plaintiffs tend to argue either
that their employers breached implied terms of an employment agreement
or that their employers discharged them in contravention of an important
failed to sign the agreement, then the railway would fire Hedges. Id. Hedges refused to sign
the agreement and the railroad subsequently dismissed him. Id. A Kansas statute prohib-
ited the employer's action. Id. at 6-7 The Supreme Court, emphasizing the importance
of freedom of contract, struck down the statute. Id. at 13. The Court included freedom
of contract in the bundle of rights of personal liberty and private property guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 14. Because the Court interpreted the Constitution to-
allow both the employer and the employee the right to choose whether to contract on
one another's terms, the Supreme Court held that the Kansas statute was unconstitutional.
Id. at 26.
37 Coppage, 236 U.S. at 10-11, Adair, 208 U.S. at 174-75.
38. Coppage, 236 U.S. at 10-11, Adair, 208 U.S. at 174-76.
39. See Pugh v See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 926 (Ct. App. 1981) (recog-
nizing implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contract); Cleary v
American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (Ct. App. 1980) (same); Borschel v City
of Perry, 512 N.W.2d 565, 566 (Iowa 1994) (stating that two exceptions to employment at-
will rule are discharge in violation of public policy and contract implied by terms of employee
handbook); Fortunev. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977)
(recognizing implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contract); Rood
v General Dynamics Corp., 507 N.W.2d 591, 598 (Mich. 1993) (stating that wrongful
discharge plaintiff can bring action either in tort or in contract); Wilder v Cody Country
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 220 (Wyo. 1994) (stating that all employment
contracts contain covenants of good faith and fair dealing).
40. See cases cited supra note 39 (illustrating exceptions to employment at-will doc-
trine). The available damages for wrongful discharge based in contract differ from damages
for retaliatory discharge under the public policy exception to employment at-will. See
Amalgamated Transit Union Local 1324 v Roberts, 434 S.E.2d 450, 452-53 (Ga. 1993)
(stating that wrongful discharge plaintiff recovering under breach of contract theory receives
damages for actual loss incurred because of breach); Kelsay v Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d
353, 359-60 (II. 1978) (allowing plaintiff in retaliatory discharge tort action to recover
punitive damages if employer commits torts with "fraud, actual malice, deliberate violence
or oppression or when the defendant acts willfully or with gross negligence as to indicate
wanton disregard of the rights of others"); SHEPARD ET AL., supra note 11, at 18-19 (stating
that retaliatory discharge tort claim allows recovery of compensatory and punitive damages
while contract claim is usually limited to lost wages).
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public policy 41 Discharged rn-house counsel have asserted both types of
claims to attempt to avoid the employment at-will rule.42
III. Wrongful Discharge: Exceptions to the Employment
At-Will Doctrne
A. Implied Contract Theory
Wrongful discharge plaintiffs seeking to avoid the strictures of the
employment at-will doctrine sometimes can argue successfully that the em-
ployer has forfeited its rights to discharge at-will and instead has agreed to
discharge the employee only under certain circumstances.4" Wrongful dis-
charge cases seldom involve written or express agreements about employ-
ment terms.' Therefore, wrongful discharge plaintiffs sometimes argue that
the courts should imply particular terms into their employment contracts.4s
Discharged employees proceeding under an implied contract theory of
wrongful discharge contend that even though the employer did not expressly
41. See Pugh v See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 926 (Ct. App. 1981) (recog-
nizing implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contract); Cleary v
American Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (Ct. App. 1980) (same); Borschel v City
of Perry, 512 N.W.2d 565, 566 (Iowa 1994) (stating that two exceptions to employment at-
will rule are discharge in violation of public policy and contract implied by terms of employee
handbook); Rood v General Dynamics Corp., 507 N.W.2d 591, 598 (Mich. 1993) (stating
that wrongful discharge plaintiff can bring action either in tort or in contract).
42. See generally Willy v Coastal Corp., 647 F Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (asserting
retaliatory discharge claim), rev'd for lack offederal jurisdiction, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir.
1988); General Dynamics Corp. v Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994) (en banc)
(asserting both breach of contract and retaliatory discharge claims); Balla v Gambro, Inc.,
584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991) (asserting retaliatory discharge claim); Herbster v North Am.
Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (same), appeal denied, 508
N.E.2d 728 (II1.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Mourad v Automobile Club Ins.
Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App.) (asserting breach of contract claim), appeal denied,
478 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1991); Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498
(Minn. 1991) (asserting both breach of contract and retaliatory discharge claims); Michaelson
v Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (same), af'd,
479 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992); Parker v M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div 1989) (asserting statutory whistleblower claim); McGonagle v Union Fidelity
Corp., 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (asserting retaliatory discharge claim).
43. See RALPH H. BAXTER, JR. & GARY R. SINISCALCO, MANAGER'S GUIDE TO
LAWFUL TERMINATIONS 17-18 (1983) (explaining breach of contract theory in wrongful
discharge actions).
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promise job security or guarantee firing only for cause, the employer's
actions and behavior implied such promises.'
Courts apply a forseeability standard to evaluate implied contract
claims. 7 First, courts consider whether the employer could have foreseen
that the employee reasonably would anticipate job security on the basis of the
employer's actions and words.48 Second, if an employee, as a result of the
employer's actions, reasonably expected job security, then the court must
determine whether it should incorporate the employee's expectations into the
employment agreement through the implied duty of good faith and fair deal-
mg49 or whether it should enforce the agreement as the employer's implied-
in-fact promise.' Employees can base their expectations on various aspects
of employment practices, including hiring letters,51 the nature of the job, 1
46. See id. at 19 (explaining method of establishing implied terms in employment
contract); WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY & MICHAEL J. LEECH, EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION:
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 63 (2d ed. 1993) (discussing implied promises of employers).
47 See HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 46, at 63 (discussing standard for implied
employment contracts).
48. See id. (explaining test for determining whether implied contract exists).
49. See id. (explaining test for determining whether implied contract exists); see also
Pugh v See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 926 (Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contract); Cleary v American
Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 728 (Ct. App. 1980) (same); Fortune v National Cash
Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1255-56 (Mass. 1977) (same); Wilder v Cody Country
Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 220 (Wyo. 1994) (stating that all employment
contracts contain covenants of good faith and fair dealing); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
CONTRACTS § 205 (1979) (stating that "every contract imposes upon each party a duty of
good faith and faith dealing"). But see Dickens v Snodgrass, Dunlap & Co., 872 P.2d 252,
261 (Kan. 1994) (finding no covenants of good faith and fair dealing in at-will employment
contracts); Bass v Happy Rest, Inc., 507 N.W.2d 317, 321 (S.D. 1993) (finding no implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment contracts); cf. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co. v Williams, 591 So. 2d 854, 857 (Ala. 1991) (determining that employment contract
contained implied duty to act in good faith, but stating that breach of that duty did not give
rise to bad faith tort action).
50. See HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 46, at 63 (explaining test for determining
whether implied contract exists).
51. See Miller v. Community Discount Ctrs., Inc., 228 N.E.2d 113, 115 (Ii. App. Ct.
1967) (implymg contract for at least one year of employment from letter stating that employer
would pay balance of employee's moving expenses after one year); Costello v Siems-Carey
Co., 167 N.W 551, 552 (Minn. 1918) (finding language in telegram that work "will take
about two years to complete" implied contract for two years of employment).
52. See Sarusal v Seung, 165 P 116, 118 (Wash. 1917) (stating that when employ-
ment was for duration of particular undertaking, then dismissal without cause before job
was completed constituted breach of implied contract); HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note
46, at 65 (describing implied contracts arising from duration of particular task). "When
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the custom of the business or the mdustry,53 salary terms,.' the employee's
length of employment,55 and statements m employee handbooks.5 6
an employee has to initiate a special operation, inaugurate a new office, or undertake
some otherjob that is reasonably contemplated to last a particular length of time, it is implied
that the period of employment will be at least sufficient to complete the assigned duty"
Id. at 65-66.
53. See Brewster v Martin Marietta Aluminum Sales, Inc., 378 N.W.2d 558, 565
(Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (finding that placing employee on probation for problems with job
performance was enough to show policy of termination for just cause only); HOLLOWAY &
LEECH, supra note 46, at 69 (stating that to determine whether employers have implied
particular termination policies, courts first examine established company practices and if no
company policy exists, courts then determine employee's reasonable expectations based on
customs and practices of industry).
54. See Mannion v Campbell Soup Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 246, 248 (Dist. Ct. App. 1966)
(inferring employment for fixed term based on fixed period of salary payment). But see
Fortenberry v Haverty Furniture Cos., 335 S.E.2d 460, 460 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985)
(determining that written agreement showing annual base pay did not imply contract
duration of one year); Roy v Woonsocket Inst. for Say., 525 A.2d 915, 918 (R.I. 1987)
(deciding that statement of employee's salary in annual terms did not imply length of
employment).
55. See Foley v Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 387-88 (Cal. 1988) (recognizing
existence of implied contract from oral assurances of continuing employment and from em-
ployee's six years and nine months of service to company); Cleary v American Airlines, 168
Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (Ct. App. 1980) (implying contract guaranteeing job security from
employee's 17 years of employment and from policy of fairness); see also Pugh v See's
Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 927 (Ct. App. 1981) (implying promise that employer
would not act arbitrarily m dealing with employee based on "totality of parties' relationship").
But see Breen v. Dakota Gear & Joint Co., 433 N.W.2d 221,223 (S.D. 1988) (upholding at-
will employment doctrine even though employee worked for nine and one-half years).
56. See Borschel v City of Perry, 512 N.W.2d 565, 566 (Iowa 1994) (recognizing
implied contract exception to employment at-will from terms of employee handbook);
Toussaint v Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980) (holding that
express terms of employment agreement or employee's reasonable expectations based on
employer's policy statement could imply contractual obligation for employers not to dismiss
employees without cause); Nicosia v Wakefern Food Corp., 643 A.2d 554, 558 (N.J. 1994)
(emphasizing that court would examine employee's reasonable expectations rather than
employer's intentions when determining whether implied contract existed); Witkowski v
Thomas J. Lipton, Inc., 643 A.2d 546, 550 (N.J. 1994) (same); Weiner v McGraw-Hill,
Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 445 (N.Y 1982) (finding limitation on employer's ability to discharge
employee based on language in employee handbook); Leahy v Starflo Coip., 431 S.E.2d
567, 568 (S.C. 1993) (stating that employer was obligated contractually to follow disciplinary
procedures outlined m company policy manual); Kumpf v United Tel. Co., 429 S.E.2d 869,
871 (S.C. Ct. App. 1993) (implying terms of handbook into employment agreement); Niesent
v Homestake Min. Co., 505 N.W.2d 781, 782 (S.D. 1993) (implying that employer could
discharge employee only for cause from terms of employee handbook); Burnside v Simpson
Paper Co., 864 P.2d 937, 943 (Wash. 1994) (allowing terms of employee policy manual to
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B. Retaliatory Discharge Tort Theory
A discharged employee may also attempt to avoid the rigid at-will
employment rule by bringing a retaliatory discharge tort action.,' A
retaliatory discharge action does not remedy the situation in which an
employer fires an employee for a good reason, for no reason, or for an
improper reason. 8 Rather, an employee may bring a retaliatory discharge
action properly only when the employee's discharge contravened a public
policy 11 In order to sustain a claim of retaliatory discharge, .an employee
must prove two elements.' First, the employee must show that the
employer fired or demoted the employee m retaliation for the employee's
modify employment at-will arrangement); Bailey v Sewell Coal Co., 437 S.E.2d 448, 451
(W Va. 1993) (implying representations made in emplbyee handbook or policy manual into
employment agreement); Wilder v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 868 P.2d 211, 217
(Wyo. 1994) (recognizing that statements in employee handbooks can imply terms of
employment contract). But see Stopczynski v Ford Motor Co., 503 N.W.2d 912, 914
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that employment manual with specific procedures for
discipline did not alter at-will employment relationship).
57 See Borschel v City of Perry, 512 N.W.2d 565, 566 (Iowa 1994) (stating that
two exceptions to employment at-will rule are discharge in violation of public policy and
contract implied by terms of employee handbook); Rood v General Dynamics Corp., 507
N.W.2d 591, 598 (Mich. 1993) (stating that wrongful discharge plaintiff can bring
action either in tort or in contract). In contrast to breach of contract claims, plaintiffs
that recover under the retaliatory discharge tort cause of action may receive punitive
damages and damages for pain and mental suffering. See Kelsay v Motorola, Inc.,
384 N.E.2d 353, 359-60 (Ill. 1978) (permitting recovery of punitive damages in retalia-
tory discharge action); see also Hansen v Harrah's, 675 P.2d 394, 397 (Nev 1984)
(permitting recovery of punitive damages in retaliatory discharge cases, but refusing to award
punitive damages in particular case).
58. See HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 46, at 144 (explaining retaliatory discharge);
Kim, supra note 3, at 894 (explaining retaliatory discharge and arguing for its adoption as
available cause of action for in-house attorneys). Retaliatory discharge falls within the public
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine. Kim, supra note 3, at 893-94.
59. See Keneally v Orgam, 606 P.2d 127, 129 (Mont. 1980) (stating that unjustified
firing does not give rise to wrongful discharge action, but cause, of action arises only when
discharge violates public policy); HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 46, at 144 (discussing
evolution of retalitory discharge tort); Kim, supra note 3, at 894 (explaining retaliatory
discharge and arguing for its adoption as available cause of action for in-house attorneys); see
also infra note 76 (providing list of jurisdictions that recognize public policy exception and
sampling of cases recognizing exception).
60. See Midgett v Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 473 N.E.2d 1280, 1285 (Il. 1984) (naming
required elements of retaliatory discharge tort), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985); Herbster
v. North Am. Co. for Health & Life Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Il1. App. Ct. 1986) (same),
appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (Ill.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); see also infra part
IV (discussing Herbster decision).
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activities or refusal to act.6' Second, the employee must prove that the
dismissal contravened a clearly stated public policy 62
In Petermann v International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396,63
California became the first state to recognize the retaliatory discharge cause
of action. The Petermann court recognized the new action m order to
address public policy concerns. 64 Other courts have experienced difficulty
61. See Midgett, 473 N.E.2d at 1285 (stating that plaintiff must allege that discharge
was retaliatory); Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 344 (stating that plaintiff must show that employer
discharged employee in retaliation for employee's activities).
62. See Parnar v Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 630-31 (Haw. 1982) (requir-
ing clearly mandated public policy to support retaliatory discharge action); Midgett, 473
N.E.2d at 1285 (same); Palmateer v International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 879 (Il.
1981) (stating that retaliatory discharge action is permitted when public policy is clear, but
action is denied when it is "equally clear that only private interests are at stake"); Herbster,
501 N.E.2d at 344 (requiring clear statement of public policy to support retaliatory discharge
action); Abrisz v Pulley Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Iowa 1978) (finding that
discharge of employee for statements in support of fellow worker's unemployment benefits
claim did not contravene clear public policy); Adler v American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d
464, 472-73 (Md. 1981) (requiring clearly mandated public policy to support retaliatory
discharge action); Bourgeous v Horizon Healthcare Corp., 872 P.2d 852, 855 (N.M. 1994)
(requiring clear mandate of public policy to support retaliatory discharge action); Campbell
v Ford Indus., Inc., 546 P.2d 141, 146 (Or. 1976) (stating that shareholder's right to inspect
company's records is not clear and compelling statement of public policy and, therefore, fails
to support employee/shareholder's retaliatory discharge action); Jones v Keogh, 409 A.2d
581, 582 (Vt. 1979) (stating that although "full employment and employer-employee harmony
are noble goals to which society aspires," these goals do not indicate clear and compelling
public policies that will support retaliatory discharge action); Thompson v St. Regis Paper
Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088-89 (Wash. 1984) (en banc) (requiring clearly mandated public
policy to support retaliatory discharge action). But see Novosel v Nationwide Ins. Co., 721
F.2d 894, 898-99 (3d Cir. 1983) (stating that clear statutory mandate of public policy is
unnecessary; plaintiff needs to show only significant and recognized public policy).
63. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
64. Petermann v Iiternational Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 29 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (holding that employer's discharge of employee for refusing to commit
perjury violated public policy and supported cause of action for retaliatory discharge). The
Petermann court evaluated whether any limits should be imposed on an employer's right to
terminate an at-will employee. Id. at 27 Local 396 (the union) employed individuals on an
at-will basis. Id. at 26. Petermann was called to testify before an investigative committee
of the California legislature. Id. Plaintiff alleged that the union ordered Petermann to perjure
himself before the committee. Id. After Petermann refused to perjure himself, the union
discharged Petermann. Id. The Petermann court discussed the relationship between
employment at-will and public policy Id. at 27 The court concluded that even though an
employment contract without a specified duration is usually terminable at-will, an employer's
right to dismiss an employee may be limited by overriding public policy concerns. Id. The
court stated: "To hold that one's continued employment could be made contingent upon his
commission of a felonious act at the instance of his employer would be to encourage criminal
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m determining when an employee's discharge violates public policy because
of the inherent ambiguity m public policy analysis.65 Thus, to establish a
retaliatory discharge tort claim, a wrongful discharge plaintiff must identify
a clearly stated public policy that his discharge violates.
6
In Palmateer v International Harvester Co.,67 for example, the
Supreme Court of Illinois attempted to defime "public policy" by surveying
case law from other jurisdictions.68 The Palmateer court stated that the
conduct upon the part of both the employee and employer and would serve to contaminate the
honest administration of public affairs." Id. Therefore, the Petermann court held that the
union wrongfully discharged Petermann and that Petermann could bring a retaliatory
discharge action under the public policy exception. Id. at 27-28.
65. See Gantt v. Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684, 687 (Cal. 1992) (recognizing. difficulty
of distinguishing between public policy and -normal employer-employee disputes); Palmateer
v International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981) (stating that public policy
is ambiguous concept).
66. See Herbster v North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 344 (1l.
App. Ct. 1986) (requiring plaintiff to show that discharge violated specific public policy to
support retaliatory discharge claim), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (Ill.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 850 (1987). Courts determine whether employers have violated clear statements of
public policy as a matter of law. See Fineman v New Jersey Dept. of Human Servs., 640
A.2d 1161, 1168-69 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1994) (stating that trial court identifies public
policy as matter of law); Niesent v Homestake Min. Co., 505 N.W.2d 781, 783 (S.D. 1993)
(stating that determination of whether employee's termination violates clear public policy is
question of law).
67 421 N.E.2d 876 (ll. 1981).
68. Palmateer v International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878-79 (Ill. 1981)
(finding that employee who was discharged for giving information to law enforcement officers
about co-worker's possible criminal violations stated cause of action for retaliatory
discharge). The Palmateer court sought to determine whether Palmateer's disclosure of
information to the police about a co-worker's possible violation of the criminal code fell
within the public policy exception to the employment at-will doctrine. Id. at 880. Ray
Palmateer worked for International Harvester (II) as a managerial employee. Id. at 877
Palmateer alleged that IH fired him because he gave law enforcement agencies information
about a fellow employee's possible violations of the state's criminal code and agreed to testify
against the co-worker if necessary Id. The court surveyed previous case law about
retaliatory discharge to determine the requirements of a public policy that would support the
retaliatory discharge claim. Id. at 877-79. The Palmateer court concluded that IH fired
Palmateer in violation of an established public policy because the state's criminal code was
the most basic form of public policy. Id. at 879. Although the court could identify no
specific constitutional or statutory provision requiring a citizen to assist in the prosecution of
a crime, the court found that public policy encouraged citizen participation in crime-fighting.
1d. at 880. Because the court found that the state had a clear public policy favoring
investigation and subsequent prosecution of crimes and that IH discharged Palmateer in
contravention of this clear public policy, the court sustained Palmateer's retaliatory discharge
action. Id.
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"matter must strike at the heart of a citizen's social rights, duties, and
responsibilities" before the court will allow the tort of retaliatory discharge.69
In order to fall within the public policy exception to the employment at-will
doctrine, many jurisdictions require retaliatory discharge plaintiffs to show
that their employers violated clearly stated and important public policies by
discharging them.7" In order to be "public," the policy must further a public
interest and not merely a private, personal, or professional end.7 Courts
often uphold public policies found in statutes and in constitutions,7 and
69. Id. at 878-79
70. See Parnar v Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 630-31 (Haw. 1982)
(requiring clearly mandated public policy to support retaliatory discharge action); Palmateer,
421 N.E.2d at 879 (stating that courts permit retaliatory discharge actions when public policy
is clear, but courts deny actions when it is "equally clear that only private interests are at
stake"); Abrisz v Pulley Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d 454, 456 (Iowa 1978) (finding that
discharge of employee for statements m support of fellow worker's unemployment benefits
claim did not contravene clear public policy); Adler v American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d
464, 472-73 (Md. 1981) (requiring clear mandate of public policy to support retaliatory
discharge action); Bourgeous v Horizon Healthcare Corp., 872 P.2d 852, 855 (N.M. 1994)
(same); Campbell v Ford Indus., Inc., 546 P.2d 141, 146 (Or. 1976) (stating that
shareholder's right to inspect company's records is not clear and compelling statement of
public policy and, therefore, fails to support employee/shareholder's retaliatory discharge
action); Jones v Keogh, 409 A.2d 581, 582 (Vt. 1979) (stating that although "full
employment and employer-employee harmony are noble goals to which society aspires," these
goals do not indicate clear and compelling public policies that will support retaliatory
discharge action); Thompson v St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088-89 (Wash. 1984)
(en banc) (requiring clearly mandated public policy to support retaliatory discharge action);
see also Jackson v Minidoka Irrigation Dist., 563 P.2d 54, 58 (Idaho 1977) (refusing to
allow retaliatory discharge action when discharge did not violate public policy); Scroghan v
Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811, 812 (Ky Ct. App. 1977) (refusing to allow retaliatory
discharge action when employer fired employee for attending night school because school
attendance was private concern rather than public policy); Keneally v Orgam, 606 P.2d 127,
129-30 (Mont. 1980) (refusing to allow retaliatory discharge action when employer
discharged employee because of dispute over internal management rather than public policy).
71. See Foley v Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 1988) (stating that
public policy affects society at large rather than personal interest of employer or employee);
Reynolds, supra note 6, at 577 (discussing necessary elements of successful cause of action
under public policy exception to employment at-will doctrine).
72. See Antinerella v Rioux, 642 A.2d 699, 705 (Conn. 1994) (stating that statutory
and constitutional provisions contain public policy); Adams v George W Cochran & Co.,
597 A.2d 28, 34 (D.C. 1991) (limiting statements of public policy to those found in state
statutes or constitution); Palmateer, 421 N.E.2d at 878 (surveying origins of public policy);
Smith v Board of Educ., 89 N.E.2d 893, 896 (ll. 1950) (stating that public policy may arise
from state statutes and constitutions); Vagts v Perry Drug Stores, Inc., 516 N.W.2d 102, 103
(Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (finding public policy most often exists in explicit statements by
legislature); Boyle v Vista Eyewear, Inc. 700 S.W.2d 859, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985)
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sometimes those found m administrative rules and regulations.73 Courts also
find public policies m the common law 74 In some cases, professional ethical
codes may present an expression of public policy 5
(recognizing public policy stated in state statutes and constitution); Pierce v Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J. 1980) (listing available sources of clear
public policy); Roberts v Adkms, 444 S.E.2d 725, 729 (W Va. 1994) (finding statements
of public policy in state constitution and legislative enactments); Brockmeyer v Dun &
Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 840 (Wis. 1983) (limiting statements of public policy to those
fbund in state statutes or constitution). See generally Tameny v Atlantic Richfield Co., 610
P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (finding that statute prohibiting price-fixing provided public policy
sufficient to support action for retaliatory discharge); Glenn v Clearman's Golden Cock Inn,
Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 769 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (allowing retaliatory discharge action by
employee dismissed for engaging in statutorily protected union activities); Petermann v
International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (allowing
retaliatory discharge action by employee who upheld statute by refusing to commit perjury);
Frampton v Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. 1973) (permitting workers'
compensation statute to provide public policy); Sventko v Kroger Co., 245 N.W.2d 151
(Mich. Ct. App. 1976) (permitting workers' compensation statute to provide public policy);
O'Sullivan v Mallon, 390 A.2d 149 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div 1978) (finding that statute
that prohubited practice of medicine without license provided public policy basis for plaintiff's
action); Nees v Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (finding that jury duty obligation created
public policy sufficient to support retaliatory discharge action); Reuther v Fowler &
Wdliams, Inc., 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978) (same); Harless v First Nat'l Bank, 246
S.E.2d 270 (W Va. 1978) (allowing retaliatory discharge action by employee who refused
to violate consumer credit code).
73. See Parnar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) (recognizing
that regulatory provisions can state public policy); Boyle v Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d
859, 871 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Pierce v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505,
512 (N.J. 1980) (finding that administrative rules and regulations can express public policy);
Roberts v Adkins, 444 S.E.2d 725, 729 (W Va. 1994) (recognizing statement of public
policy in legislatively approved regulations).
74. See Antinerella v Rioux, 642 A.2d 699, 705 (Conn. 1994) (stating that although
constitution and statutes provide statements of public policy, courts also develop public
policy); Pamar, 652 P.2d at 631 (allowing judicial decisions to establish public policy, but
urging courts to proceed cautiously when acting without prior legislative expression on issue);
Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (111. 1981) (stating that when
statutes and constitutions are silent about issue, courts look to judicial decisions for statements
of public policy); Smith v Board of Educ., 89 N.E.2d 893, 896 (Ill. 1950) (same); Pierce,
417 A.2d at 512 (stating that courts express public policy); Gutierrez v Sundancer Indian
Jewelry, Inc., 868 P.2d 1266, 1272-73 (N.M. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that judiciary serves
as appropriate source of public policy), cert. denied, 869 P.2d 820 (N.M. 1994).
75. See Boyle, 700 S.W.2d at 871 (stating that ethical codes can state public policy in
certain instances); Cisco v United Parcel Serv., Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1343 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1984) (stating that mandates of professional ethics code may define public policy sufficient
to support wrongful discharge claim); see also Alfred G. Feliu, Note, Discharge of
Professional Employees: Protecting Against Dismissal for Acts Within a Professional Code
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Currently, most states recognize the retaliatory discharge action.76
of Ethics, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv 149, 179 (1979-1980) (arguing that discharge of
professional for his compliance with ethical standards of profession should establish prima
facie case of violation of public policy); cf. Pierce, 417 A.2d at 512 (stating that although
professional ethical codes could express public policy, such codes would probably not provide
clear statements of public policy because ethical codes serve only to guide members of
particular professions).
76. See HOLLOWAY & LEECH, supra note 46, at 135 (providing summary of states
creating public policy exception); cf. Reynolds, supra note 6, at 559 (pointing out that even
though jurisdictions recognize public policy exception, particular facts of case determine
outcome). The following jurisdictions recognize the retaliatory discharge cause of action:
Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin
and Wyoming. See generally Lucas v Brown & Root, Inc., 736 F.2d 1202 (8th Cir. 1984)
(allowing public policy exception to employment at-will doctrine); Kilpatrick v Delaware
County Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, 632 F Supp. 542 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(same); Newman v Legal Servs. Corp., 628 F Supp. 535 (D.D.C. 1986) (same); Winther
v DEC Int'l, Inc., 625 F Supp. 100 (D. Colo. 1985) (same); Roberts v Citicorp Diners
Club, Inc., 597 F Supp. 311 (D. Md. 1984) (same); Merkel v Scovill, Inc., 570 F Supp.
133 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (same); Knight v American Guard & Alert, Inc., 714 P.2d 788
(Alaska 1986) (expressing willingness to recognize public policy exception to employment
at-will doctrine, but unable to determine whether theory applied without full record of case);
Wagenseller v Scottsdale Memorial Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025 (Ariz. 1985) (allowing public
policy exception to employment at-will doctrine); City of Green Forest v Morse, 873 S.W.2d
155 (Ark. 1994) (same); Tameny v Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980)
(same); Petermann v International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 396, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct.
App. 1959) (creating public policy exception to at-will employment doctrine); Antinerella v
Rioux, 642 A.2d 699 (Conn. 1994) (allowing public policy exception to employment at-will
doctrine); Magnan v Anaconda Indus., Inc., 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984) (same); Sheets v
Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385 (Conn. 1980) (same); Lebow v American Chem.
& Ref. Co., No. 112554, 1994 WL 411331 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 29, 1994) (same); Parnar
v Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625 (Haw. 1983) (same); Smith v Chaney Brooks
Realty, Inc., 865 P.2d 170 (Haw. Ct. App. 1994) (same); Jackson v Minidoka Irrigation
Dist., 563 P.2d 54 (Idaho 1977) (same); Palmateer v International Harvester Co., 421
N.E.2d 876 (Ill. 1981) (same); Kelsey v Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill. 1978)
(accepting public policy exception to employment at-will in context of discharge for filing
workers' compensation claim); Frampton v Central Ind. Gas Co., 297 N.E.2d 425 (Ind.
1973) (accepting possibility of public policy exception); Borschel v City of Perry, 512
N.W.2d 565 (Iowa 1994) (recognizing availability of public policy exception to employment
at-will doctrine, but not applying exception in particular case); Springer v Weeks & Leo Co.,
429 N.W.2d 558 (Iowa 1988) (allowing public policy exception to employment at-will
doctrine); Palmer v Brown, 752 P.2d 685 (Kan. 1988) (same); Murphy v City of Topeka-
Shawnee County Dept. of Labor Servs., 630 P.2d 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (same);
Firestone Textile Co. v Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky 1983) (same); Pari-Mutuel Clerks
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Union Local 541 v Kentucky Jockey Club, 551 S.W.2d 801 (Ky 1977) (same); Hobson v
McLean Hosp. Corp., 522 N.E.2d 975 (Mass. 1988) (same); Watassek v Michigan, Dept.
of Mental Health, 372 N.W.2d 617 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Trombetta v Detroit, T.
& I.R.R., 265 N.W.2d 385 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (same); Phipps v Clark Oil & Ref.
Corp., 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987) (same); Boyle v Vista Eyewear, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 859
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (same); Henderson v St. Louis Hous. Auth., 605 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978) (same); Keneally v Orgain, 606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980) (recognizing possibility
of public policy exception, but not applying it to facts of particular case); Hansen v Harrah's,
675 P.2d 394 (Nev. 1984) (allowing public policy exception to employment at-will doctrine);
Cloutier v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 436 A.2d 1140 (N.H. 1981) (same); Monge v Beebe
Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (same); Lalley v Copygraphics, 428 A.2d 1317
(N.J. 1981) (same); Pierce v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980)
(recognizing public policy exception to at-will employment doctrine, but not applying it to
particular facts of case); Chavez v Manville Prods. Corp., 777 P.2d 371 (N.M. 1989)
(allowing public policy exception to employment at-will doctrine); Daniel v Carolina
Sunrock Corp., 430 S.E.2d 306 (N.C. Ct. App.) (same), rev'd in part, 436 S.E.2d 835 (N.C.
1993); Sides v Duke Hosp., 328 S.E.2d 818 (N.C. Ct. App.) (same), review denied, 333
S.E.2d 490 (N.C.) and 335 S.E.2d 13 (N.C. 1985); Krem v Marian Manor Nursing Home,
415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D. 1987) (same); Burk v K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla. 1989)
(same); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Ore. 1975) (en banc) (same); Yamdl v Ingersoll-Rand
Co., 422 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (same); Ludwick v This Minute of Carolina, Inc.,
337 S.E.2d 213 (S.C. 1985) (same); Niesent v Homestake Min. Co., 505 N.W.2d 781 (S.D.
1993) (same); Johnson v Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225 (S.D. 1988) (same); Hodges v,.
S.C. Toof& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992) (same); Sabme Pilot Serv., Inc. v Hauck,
687 S.W.2d 733 (Tex. 1985) (same); Hodges v Gibson Prods. Co., 811 P.2d 151 (Utah
1991) (same); Payne v Rozendaal, 520 A.2d 586 (Vt. 1986) (same); Lockhart v
Commonwealth Educ. Sys. Corp., 439 S.E.2d 328 (Va. 1994) (same); Bowman v State
Bank, 331 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1985) (same); Thompson v St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081
(Wash. 1984) (same); Roberts v Adkins, 444 S.E.2d 725 (W Va. 1994) (same); Harless v
First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W Va. 1978) (same); Brockmeyer v Dun & Bradstreet,
335 N.W.2d 834 (Wis. 1983) (same); Siebken v Town of Wheatland, 700 P.2d 1236 (Wyo.
1985) (same).
The following states fail to recognize retaliatory discharge: Alabama, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Nebraska, New York, and Rhode Island. See generally Frichter v
National Life & Accident Ins. Co., 620 F Supp. 922 (E.D. La. 1985) (refusing to recognize
public policy exception to employment at-will doctrine), aff'd, 790 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1986);
Schultheiss v Mobil Oil Exploration & Producing Southeast, Inc., 592 F Supp. 628 (W.D.
La. 1984) (same); Hinrichs v Tranquilaire Hosp., 352 So.2d 1130 (Ala. 1977) (same);
Hartley v Ocean Reef Club, Inc., 476 So.2d 1327 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that
common law action for retaliatory discharge does not exist); Quinn v Cardiovascular
Physicians, P.C., 326 S.E.2d 460 (Ga. 1985) (refusing to recognize public policy exception
to employment at-will doctrine); Georgia Power Co. v Busbin, 250 S.E.2d 442 (Ga. 1978)
(same); Gil v Metal Serv Corp., 412 So. 2d 706 (La. Ct. App.) (same), cert. dented, 414
So. 2d 379 (La. 1982); J.C. Kelly v Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So.2d 874 (Miss.
1981) (refusing to recognize public policy exception to employment at-will doctrine and
electing to leave decision to legislature); Blair v Physicians Mut. Ins. Co., 496 N.W.2d 483
(Neb. 1993) (refusing to recognize public policy exception to employment at-will doctrihe);
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Courts, however, have hesitated to allow in-house attorneys to bnng
retaliatory discharge actions and, as a result, in-house attorneys have
alleged retaliatory discharge in only ten reported cases.77 Furthermore,
state supreme courts addressed this issue only in four of these cases.7" As
of June 1994, no state supreme court had allowed an in-house attorney to
recover damages under the tort of retaliatory discharge.79 On July 18,
1994, however, the California Supreme Court held, in General Dynamics
Murphy v American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y 1983) (same); Volino v
General Dynamics, 539 A.2d 531 (R.I. 1988) (same). But see Schriner v Meginnis Ford
Co., 421 N.W.2d 755, 759 (Neb. 1988) (stating that court would allow limited public policy
exception in case in which employee acted in good faith and upon reasonable cause in
reporting employer's suspected illegal conduct); Wieder v Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y
1992) (allowing discharged associate to bring wrongful discharge action against law firm
when firm discharged lawyer for his insistence that firm comply with ethical rules).
Delaware and Maine have not taken stances on the retaliatory discharge cause of action.
But see Hansrote v Amer Indus. Technologies, Inc., 586 F Supp. 113 (W.D. Pa. 1984)
(applying Delaware law in federal court to recognize limited public policy exception when
employer discharged employee after employee refused to engage in illegal or unethical
behavior), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1985); Larrabee v Penobscot Frozen Foods, Inc.,
486 A.2d 97 (Me. 1984) (suggesting that given appropriate case, court would recognize
public policy exception); MacDonald v Eastern Fine Paper, Inc., 485 A.2d 228 (Me. 1984)
(same).
77 See Corello, supra note 6, at 399-400 (citing eight reported retaliatory discharge
cases by in-house attorneys prior to General Dynamics decision). See generally Willy v
Coastal Corp., 647 F Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (reporting that in-house attorney sued
employer and alleged retaliatory discharge), rev'dfor lack offederaljunsdiction, 855 F.2d
1160 (5th Cir. 1988); General Dynamics Corp. v Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994)
(en banc) (same); Balla v Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991) (same); Herbster v
North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (111. App. Ct. 1986) (same), appeal
denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (Ill.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); GTE' Prods. Corp. v
Stewart, No. 06749, 1995 WL 457297 (Mass. Aug. 1, 1995); Mourad v Automobile Club
Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App.) (same), appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 443
(Mich. 1991); Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991)
(same); Michaelson v Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991) (same), aft'd, 479 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992); Parker v M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d
215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1989) (same); McGonagle v Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d
878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (same).
78. See generally General Dynamics Corp. v Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994)
(en banc) (evaluating retaliatory discharge cause of action for in-house counsel); Balla v
Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Il. 1991) (same); GTE Prods. Corp. v Stewart, No. 06749,
1995 WL 457297 (Mass. Aug. 1, 1995); Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 478
N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991) (same).
79. See Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 108, 110 (rejecting retaliatory discharge cause of action
for general counsel); Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 504 (rejecting retaliatory discharge cause of
action because no violation of whistleblower statute occurred).
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Corp. v Superior Court,8" that California. would allow in-house attorneys
to bring properly pleaded retaliatory discharge causes of action
s.8
IV The Status of the Retaliatory Discharge Tort for
In-House Attorneys Before General Dynamics
A survey of the previous cases that have grappled with the issue of
whether to allow corporate counsel to bring retaliatory discharge tort
actions provides a better understanding of the climate in which the General
Dynamics decision occurred. A dismissed in-house attorney brought the
first reported retaliatory discharge claim in Texas in 1986.82 This claim
arose shortly after the Texas Supreme Court agreed to recognize a public
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine for dismissed
nonattorney employees. 3
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, in
Willy v Coastal Corp.," initially addressed the issue of whether courts
should permit rn-house counsel to assert retaliatory discharge claims against
their employers.' Donald Willy worked as Coastal Corporation's (Coastal)
in-house counsel and provided the company with legal advice about its
compliance with federal and state environmental regulations. 6 Willy
alleged that Coastal dismissed him because he required the corporation to
comply with all of the applicable environmental laws and that the company
objected to this strict compliance.87
The Willy court examined the public policy exception to the employ-
ment at-will doctrine under Texas law to determine whether the court
should expand the exception to include in-house attorneys' actions for
80. 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994).
81. General Dynamics Corp. v Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 505 (Cal. 1994) (en
band).
82. SeeWillyv Coastal Corp., 647 F Supp. 116, 117 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (declining to
expand public policy exception to employment at-will to in-house attorneys), rev'dfor lack
offederaljurisdiction, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988).
83. See Sabme Pilot Serv., Inc. v Hauck, 687 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex. 1985) (creating
narrow public policy exception applicable only if employer dismissed employee for refusing
to perform illegal act).
84. 647 F Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
85. Willy v Coastal Corp., 647 F Supp. 116, 117 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (decliningto
expand employment at-will's public policy exception to in-house attorneys), rev'dfor lack of
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retaliatory discharge.88 The district court interpreted Texas's public policy
exception narrowly 89 The court reasoned that because attorneys must
uphold their state's ethical rules, attorneys should and will withdraw from
representation if their clients intend to commit illegal acts.9' Thus, rather
than allowing a retaliatory discharge action, the Willy court determined
that withdrawal from representation remained the attorney's appropriate
remedy in this type of situation.9' The court stated further that if at-
torneys failed to withdraw, but also refused to honor the wishes of their
clients, then they should not be surprised when their employers dismissed
them. 92 Therefore, as a result of the professional ethical obligations of
in-house attorneys, the Willy court declined to expand the public policy
exception to allow corporate attorneys to bring retaliatory discharge
actions.93
Three years later, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, in McGon-
agle v Union Fidelity Corp. , addressed the same issue as the Willy
court. 95 The Union Fidelity Corporation (Union Fidelity) hired John
McGonagle to work for the company's insurance subsidiary as an associate
counsel for legal affairs. 96 Union Fidelity allowed McGonagle to advance
quickly to positions of authority in the company 9 Despite McGonagle's
88. Id. at 118.
89. Id. at 118 n.2.
90. Id. at 118; see TEX. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-110 (1988)
(describing situations in which attorney must or may withdraw). When discussing attorneys'
ethical obligations to withdraw, the Willy court could have been referring to DR 2-1 10(B)(2),
which states that an attorney shall withdraw from employment if: "He knows or it is obvious
that his continued employment will result in violation of a Disciplinary Rule." Id. DR 2-
1 10(B)(2). Permissive withdrawal could also be an appropriate course of action if the client
"[plersonally seeks to pursue an illegal course of conduct," "[i]nsists that the lawyer pursue
a course of conduct that is illegal or that is prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules," or "[iun-
sists that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the
lawyer but not prohibited under the Disciplinary Rules." Id. DR 2-1 10(C)(1)(b), (c), (e).
91. Willy, 647 F Supp. at 118.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
95. McGonagle v Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878, 882 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
96. Id. at 879
97 Id. Over the course of McGonagle's employment, Union Fidelity promoted
McGonagle to the positions of general counsel, vice president of Union Fidelity's life
insurance company, a member of the board of directors, and vice president of two of the
company's subsidiaries. Id.
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promotion to vice president of two of the company's insurance subsidiaries,
McGonagle's responsibilities remained the same as those that he had
exercised previously as Union Fidelity's general counsel.9" The conflict
between McGonagle and Union Fidelity occurred when McGonagle refused
to authorize the distribution of insurance policies that he believed violated
various state laws.99 After McGonagle and other company officials
discussed the situation, the president of the insurance subsidiaries, John
Cooney, requested McGonagle's resignation.' ° Union Fidelity informed
McGonagle that the company wanted him to resign because some of the
company officers had complained about the quality of Ins work.10' Cooney
agreed to meet with McGonagle on the following day to discuss the
matter."t z When McGonagle arrived, however, the head of security refused
to allow him to enter the premses.0" Eventually, McGonagle spoke with
Cooney, but the parties failed to resolve the matter."°
McGonagle sued Union Fidelity and alleged that Union Fidelity
had fired him for insisting that the company comply with various state
insurance laws.' McGonagle alleged further that his disnussal violated
clear and compelling public policy, and therefore the discharge was
actionable under state law 106 Upon review of the trial court's decision,'07
the McGonagle court acknowledged that Pennsylvania recognized a public
policy exception to the employment at-will doctnne.'0 8 The court then
98. Id.
99. Id. McGonagle also declined to take other actions for Union Fidelity Id. at 880.
McGonagle refused to issue insurance policies in two states based on applications that he
believed that the jurisdiction would classify as illegal. Id. McGonagle behaved m this
manner even though he recognized that his failure to issue those policies would adversely
affect Union Fidelity's financial interests. Id. Also, McGonagle disagreed with other
company practices, such as refusing to cover CAT scan claims, and decided that this company




103. Id. McGonagle also had difficulty retrieving his belongings from the premises. Id.




107 Id. The jury at the trial level rendered a verdict in favor of McGonagle and
awarded McGonagle $30,000 for his wrongful discharge claim and $32,000 in punitive
damages. Id.
108. Id. at 882; see Geary v United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 180 (Pa. 1974)
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attempted to determine whether McGonagle's case fell within that
exception.,09
McGonagle relied on the existence of insurance laws as representations
of public policy 110 The McGonagle court determined that although no
Pennsylvania case directly applied, the trend in this area of law did not
support McGonagle's contention that Union Fidelity had violated a well-
recognized and significant public policy ... The Superior Court of Pennsyl-
(recognizing possibility of public policy exception to employment at-will); Yamdl v
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 422 A.2d 611, 617 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (stating that employee may
have wrongful discharge claim against employer when discharge of employee at-will threatens
public policy).
109. McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 882.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 883. The court made specific reference to Sheets v Teddy's Frosted Foods
when examining whether McGonagle relied on a well-recognized public policy See Sheets
v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427 A.2d 385, 387-89 (Conn. 1980) (permitting discharged
quality control manager to pursue wrongful discharge claim founded on clear statement of
public policy in Connecticut Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); see also CONN. GEN. STAT.
§§ 19-213, 19-215, 19-222 (1977) (providing applicable provisions of Connecticut Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Act) (current version at CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 21a-93, 21a-95, 21a-102
(1994)). In Sheets, the Supreme Court of Connecticut considered whether to allow a
discharged employee to maintain a retaliatory discharge tort action against his former
employer. Sheets, 427 A.2d at 386. Sheets worked for Teddy's Frosted Foods (Frosted
Foods) as the company's quality control director and operations manager. Id. at 385-86.
Sheets noticed that the company began to deviate from the requisite quality control standards
by using lower quality vegetables and underweight meat in the company's frozen food
products. Id. at 386. The alterations in the quality and in the weight of the food items used
to make the company's products conflicted with the company's express representations on the
products' labels. Id. Because the contents differed from the representations of the company's
labels, the company's practices violated the Connecticut Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. Id.,
see CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 19-213, 19-215, 19-222 (defining misbranded food and stating its
consequences under Connecticut Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act) (current version at CONN.
GEN. STAT. §§ 21a-93, 21a-95, 21a-102). Sheets informed Frosted Foods of his concern with
the company's substandard practices, but Frosted Foods ignored Sheets's suggestions and
fired him. Sheets, 427 A.2d at 386. Sheets contended that the company dismissed him in
retaliation for his efforts to promote compliance with Connecticut state laws. Id. Sheets
brought wrongful discharge claims under both contract and tort theories. Id. The Sheets
court first examined Sheets's tort theory of retaliatory discharge. Id. The court attempted
to balance the need for a company's managerial discretion with the protection of employees
who lack the bargaining power necessary to secure employment contracts for a definite term.
Id. at 387-88. The court determined that the Connecticut Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act
applied to Sheets and that Sheets could have been held criminally liable for violating the act.
Id. at 388; see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19-215 (discussing penalities of violating statute) (current
version at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 21a-95). The court stressed that Sheets's job was to ensure
the quality of products for the company and by definition this job involved Sheets's
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varna also commented that courts had refused to allow wrongful discharge
actions that were premised on alleged violations of public policy that were
not clearly stated."' The superior court concluded that Pennsylvania courts
decide wrongful discharge claims on a case-by-case basis."l 3 The Mc-
Gonagle court found this method especially appropriate in cases concerning
the actions of professionals." 4 The court accepted the proposition that a
professional's dual obligations to follow ethical codes, as well as state laws,
could necessitate the professional's refusal to engage in some acts desired
by the client." 5
The McGonagle decision ultimately turned on McGonagle's discretion-
ary behavior." 6 McGonagle used his own judgment to arrive at his
opinions about the legality of the insurance policies at issue."' An
employer can ovemde an employee's discretionary decision and proceed
m the manner that it wishes if the employer's reasons for the decision have
adequate foundation." 8 Because McGonagle provided the court with
statutes conveying only general statements of public policy, McGonagle
discretion. Sheets, 427 A.2d at 388. After determining that the Connecticut Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act represented public policy and after reviewing several cases from other
jurisdictions discussing the retaliatory discharge cause of action, the court allowed Sheets's
retaliatory discharge claim. Id. at 389.
112. McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 884; see Callahan v Scott Paper Co., 541 F Supp. 550,
563 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (stating that although employees' efforts to stop illegal price discounts
and promotional allowances were laudable, public policy on this issue was unclear and
employer's interest was paramount); Lampe v Presbyterian Medical Ctr., 590 P.2d 513, 515-
16 (Colo. Ct. App. 1978) (finding that statute explaining licensing principles for nurses
created no actionable claim); Adler v American Standard Corp., 432 A.2d 464, 471-72 (Md.
1981) (finding criminal code and employees' claims of bribery and falsifying company's
records too vague to constitute actionable public policy violation); Pierce v Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 514 (N.J. 1980) (stating that Hippocratic oath did not
constitute clear statement of public policy that would support wrongful discharge action);
Yamdl v Ingersoll-Rand Co., 422 A.2d 611, 620 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (finding that
employee's discharge for informing company of product defect was not in contravention of
clearly stated public policy).
113. McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 884; see Rossi v Pennsylvania State Umv., 489 A.2d
828, 831-32 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (stating that review of wrongful discharge cases occurs on
case-by-case basis).
114. McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 884-85.
115. Id. at 885; see Pierce v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 512 (N.J.
1980) (discussing dual roles of professionals).
116. McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 885.
117 Id., see Pierce, 417 A.2d at 507, 513.
118. McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 885.
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failed to show a clear enough public policy to support Ins retaliatory
discharge claim.119 Ultimately, the court refused to recognize McGonagle's
cause of action for retaliatory discharge because Umon Fidelity had not
violated a clearly defined public policy 120
McGonagle parallels the Supreme Court of New Jersey's reasoning m
Pierce v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. 2 Although Pierce involved a medi-
cal professional," both the Pierce and the McGonagle courts refused to
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
122. Pierce v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 506 (N.J. 1980) (allowing
wrongful discharge cause of action when discharge goes against clearly expressed public
policy, but refusing to allow research doctor to bring wrongful discharge action when dis-
missal occurred due to difference of professional medical judgment); see also Lampe v Pres-
byterian Medical Ctr., 590 P.2d 513, 515-16 (Colo. Ct. App. 1979) (refusing to allow
discharged nurse to bring wrongful discharge action because statute stating general principles
about licensing of nurses did not state public policy). In Pierce, the Supreme Court of New
Jersey considered whether a doctor could bring a wrongful discharge action premised upon
her refusal to violate the medical code of professional ethics. Id. at 513. Dr. Grace Pierce
worked for Ortho Pharmaceutical Corporation (Ortho) as the director of one of the three
major sections of the medical research department. Id. at 506. Dr. Pierce's employment was
at-will because she signed no employment contract, nor did she work for a fixed term. Id.
The incident leading to Dr. Pierce's dismissal arose from a research team's search for a liquid
drug to treat diarrhea in children and in the elderly Id. at 506-07 Dr. Pierce opposed the
selected formula because it contained a high amount of saccharin and saccharin was poten-
tially dangerous. Id. at 507 Dr. Pierce informed her supervisor that she believed that her
continued work on the drug containing saccharin would violate the Hippocratic oath. Id.
After this meeting, Dr. Pierce's supervisor removed Dr. Pierce from the saccharin project
and asked her to select other projects. Id. Although Dr. Pierce received the same amount
of compensation, she believed that Ortho had demoted her. Id. Subsequently, Dr. Pierce
resigned from her job and initiated a retaliatory discharge action against Ortho under both
contract and tort theories. Id. at 508. Dr. Pierce alleged that Ortho demanded that she
engage in conduct that violated the Hippocratic oath. Id. The Pierce court examined the
history of the employment at-will doctrine and the emergence of exceptions to the rule. Id.
at 509-11. The Supreme Court of New Jersey emphasized that other courts had refrained
from interfering with employers' rights to make business decisions and select appropriate
personnel. Id. at 510-11. The court concluded that New Jersey law should allow remedies
for employees whose employers wrongfully discharge them, but that the courts must balance
the interests of employers, employees, and the public in these situations. Id. at 511. Al-
though the Pierce court recognized that professionals might have to refuse to perform certain
acts to comply with professional ethical codes, the court also stated that a violation of person-
al morals did not give rise to a retaliatory discharge cause of action. Id. at 512. The court
then listed the possible sources of clear public policy- legislation, administrative rules, admm-
istrative regulations, administrative decisions, and judicial decisions. Id. In some cases, pro-
fessional ethics codes may present an expression of public policy, but the Pierce court care-
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recognize the plaintiffs' causes of action for retaliatory discharge because
the individuals' actions involved the exercise of discretion.123 Additionally,
in both cases the courts determined that the plaintiffs failed to prove that
their employers' actions violated clearly stated public policies. 24
Michaelson v Minnesota Mining & Manufacturng Co. " presented a
slightly different question to the Minnesota Court of Appeals. Michaelson
explored two theories of wrongful discharge: implied contract and
retaliatory discharge based on statutory authority 126 Victor Michaelson
worked for the Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (Minnesota
Mining) as the company's general counsel and handled primarily equal
employment opportunity issues. 1 27 At various times, Michaelson rendered
advice to Minnesota Mining about employment problems and situations. 8
Minnesota Mimng sometimes followed Michaelson's advice, while at other
times the company disregarded his suggestions.129
Michaelson consistently performed better than average, according to
company performance evaluations.13 Michaelson did, however, receive
one low performance evaluation. 3  As a result of this evaluation,
Minnesota Mining reassigned Michaelson to a job that did not require the
preparation of litigation matters."' Michaelson viewed his new assignment
fully noted that a professional code of ethics would probably not provide a clear statement of
public policy because the code only serves to guide members of a particular profession. Id.
The Pierce court concluded that the Hippocratic oath failed to assert a clear mandate of public
policy and, therefore, the court denied Dr. Pierce's wrongful discharge suit. Id. at 514.
123. Compare McGonagle v Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878, 885 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1989) (finding that plaintiff's opinion about company's practices fails to meet requirement of
clear expression of public policy) with Pierce v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505,
507, 513 (N.J. 1980) (stating that difference in medical opinions will not support retaliatory
discharge action under public policy exception).
124. Pierce, 417 A.2d at 514; McGonagle, 556 A.2d at 885.
125. 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
126. Michaelson v Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174, 180-81 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991) (determining that corporate counsel failed to state claim of retaliatory
discharge), aff'd, 479 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992).
127 Id. at 176-77
128. Id. at 177
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. Minnesota Mining observed that Michaelson exhibited poor time management
skills, lack of attention to his cases, and poor communication with management. Id.
132. Id. Rather than terminating Michaelson's employment, the corporation shifted
Michaelson's responsibilities. Id.
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as a demotion, and therefore informed the company that he found the
transition to his new job too difficult, and elected not to continue to work
for Minnesota Mining.133
Michaelson asserted a variety of claims in his suit against Minnesota
Mining, including breach of contract and retaliatory discharge."4 After the
trial court granted Minnesota Mining's summary judgment motion on all
of the claims, 35 Michaelson appealed to the Minnesota Court of Appeals.' 36
In evaluating Michaelson's claims, the court began by discussing the
general principle that clients may discharge attorneys for any reason, and
at any time, without being liable for damages for breach of contract.'3 7 The
court based this assertion on both case law'38 and the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct. 39 After reviewing the applicable precedent, the
court concluded that a client must have the absolute authority to discharge
133. Id.
134. Id. In addition to breach of contract and retaliatory discharge claims, Michaelson
asserted claims for breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, defamation,




137 Id. at 178; see Lawler v Dunn, 176 N.W 989, 990 (1920) (stating that client may
discharge attorney at any time). The court also concluded that the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct required withdrawal from representation if the client discharged the
attorney See MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(3) (1993) (requiring
attorney withdrawal upon discharge by client). In Minnesota, a lawyer must withdraw from
representation if the client demands that the lawyer participate in illegal conduct or in conduct
that violates the state's ethical rules or other law. Id. Rule 1.16 cmt. 1985.
138. See State v. Smith, 110 N.W.2d 159, 167 (Minn. 1961) (stating that client must be
able to discharge attorney at any time because of need for trust between attorney and client);
Lawler v Dunn, 176 N.W 989, 990 (Minn. 1920) (stating that discharge of attorney does
not constitute breach of contract); In re Lachmund's Estate, 170 P.2d 748, 752 (Or. 1946)
(stating that client must be able to discharge attorney at any time because of need for trust
between attorney and client); see also Herbster v North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501
N.E.2d 343, 344 (III. App. Ct. 1986) (stating that clients generally may discharge attorneys
at any time), appeal dented, 508 N.E.2d 728 (Ill.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987);
Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 501 (Minn. 1991) (same); nfra
notes 154-95 and accompanying text (discussing Herbster and Nordling opinions). The court
discussed the Herbster and Nordling decisions and agreed that "the client must have absolute
authority to fire the attorney, especially when a breakdown of trust occurs." Michaelson, 474
N.W.2d at 178 (quoting Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 465 N.W.2d 81, 86 (Minn.
Ct. App.), rev'd, 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991)).
139 Michaelson, 474 N.W.2d at 178; see MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1. 16(a)(3) (1993) (requiring attorney to withdraw upon request of client).
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his attorney, especially when the trust between the attorney and the client
dimmushes. 1" The court determined that a lawyer cannot properly sue a
former client and use confidential information gathered during the course
of representation as evidence against the former client. 41 This type of
action subverts the attorney-client privilege.
142
In asserting Ins breach of contract claim, Michaelson stated that
Minnesota Mining had pronused to employ Michaelson for as long as he
performed Ins job well.1 43 Michaelson argued that Minnesota Mining's
promise transformed his at-will employment relationship into one that Ins
employer could terminate only for cause.' 4 In addition to these assurances,
Michaelson provided further support for Ins contention by showing that he
relied on the policies provided in the company's conduct guide, operating
manual, and corrective action guide. 45 The court of appeals rejected these
arguments and found that no contract existed because Michaelson failed to
provide evidence that Minnesota Mining's promise conveyed an offer or
manifested an intent to contract. 46 Because the provisions in the conduct
guide failed to meet the required level of specificity, the court denied
Michaelson's claim that the company's printed materials added terms to
Michaelson's contract. 47 In rejecting Michaelson's breach of contract
claim, the court of appeals emphasized the potential harm to the attorney-
client relationship that could occur if courts perrmtted discharged attorneys
to sue their former clients and to use information learned in the course of
the relationship as evidence against the employer.
48
140. Michaelson, 474 N.W.2d at 178.
141. Id.
142. Id., see infra notes 393-97 and accompanying text (discussing attorney-client
privilege).
143. Michaelson, 474 N.W.2d at 176.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 177; see Pine River State Bank v Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn.
1983) (stating that in order for terms of handbooks and manuals to become part of
employment contracts, provisions must meet requirements of unilateral contract); see also
Lewis v Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 883 (Minn. 1986) (requiring
specificity of handbook provisions to alter employment contract). To meet the requirements
of a unilateral contract, the provision must make a definite offer, the offer must be conveyed
to the employee, and the employee must accept the offer. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d at 627
146. Michaelson, 474 N.W.2d at 179.
147 Id. at 180; see Lewis, 389 N.W.2d at 883 (requiring specificity of handbook
provisions to alter employment contract); Mettille, 333 N.W.2d at 627 (setting forth test of
required specificity of handbook provisions).
148. Michaelson, 474 N.W.2d at 180; see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
1019
52 WASH. &LEE L. REV 991 (1995)
Michaelson brought his retaliatory discharge claim pursuant to a
Minnesota statute that authorized such actions. 149 The court offered several
reasons why Michaelson's retaliatory discharge claim failed under the
applicable statute. 5 The court stated that Michaelson was unable to
establish a causal link between his actions and the company's subsequent
retaliation.'5 ' Additionally, instead of discharging Michaelson, Minnesota
Mimng shifted Michaelson's responsibilities.'52 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals rejected Michaelson's remaining claims.' 53
Rule 1.6 (1992) (stating that information gained in course of attorney-client relationship is
confidential); MODEL CODE OF PROFEsSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1983) (same).
149 Michaelson, 474 N.W.2d at 180; see MINN. STAT. § 181.932(1)(a) (1993) (prohib-
iting retaliatory discharge). The statute provides:
An employer shall not discharge, discipline, threaten, otherwise discriminate
against, or penalize an employee regarding the employee's compensation, terms,
conditions, location, or privileges of employment because the employee, or
a person acting on behalf of an employee, in good faith, reports a violation or
suspected violation of any federal or state law or rule adopted pursuant to law to
any employer or to any governmental body or law enforcement official.
MINN. STAT. § 181.932(i)(a) (1993).
150. Michaelson, 474 N.W.2d at 180. First, although Michaelson contended that
Minnesota Mining violated Title VII and equal employment opportunity laws, Michaelson
offered no proof to support his claim. Id., see also Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, 3 (1988
& Supp. V 1993) (prohibiting employers from discriminating on basis of race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin). Second, Michaelson's behavior fell outside of the behavior protected
by the applicable statute because instead of reporting illegal conduct, Michaelson offered
Minnesota Mining advice and feedback on particular situations. Michaelson, 474 N.W.2d
at 180. Third, Michaelson did not report the alleged violation of the statute to any outside
authority as required by the statute. Id., see supra note 149 (providing language of applicable
statute). Fourth, Michaelson failed to prove the necessary causal link between his actions in
the company and Minnesota Mining's alleged subsequent retaliation. Michaelson, 474
N.W.2d at 180. Finally, Minnesota Mining did not discharge Michaelson. Id.
151. Id. at 180.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 181. The Minnesota Court of Appeals relied on state precedent to reject
Michaelson's breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cause of action. Id.,
see Hunt v IBM Mid Am. Employees Fed. Credit Union, 384 N.W.2d 853, 858 (Minn.
1986) (refusing to read implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing into employment
contract); Wild v Rang, 234 N.W.2d 775, 790 (Minn. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 424 U.S.
902 (1976). The court, instead, classified Michaelson as an at-will employee. Michaelson,
474 N.W.2d at 181. With respect to Michaelson's tortious interference claim, the court of
appeals declared that Michaelson's co-workers acted within the scope of their job duties when
evaluating Michaelson's work performance and when transferring Michaelson to engage in
different responsibilities. Id. The court also rejected Michaelson's defamation claim arising
out of a letter that listed Michaelson's job deficiencies. Id. The court failed to address
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In Nordling v Northern States Power Co. , the Minnesota Supreme
Court reached an outcome different from the Michaelson decision of the
Minnesota Court of Appeals by allowing an in-house attorney to proceed
with an action for breach of contract. 55 Gale Nordling worked for the
Northern States Power Company (Northern States) as an in-house
attorney 156 Nordling worked primarily with the company's engineering
department. 57 The controversy between Nordling and Northern States
began when the company constructed a new power facility 158 Northern
States lured a private attorney to advise the company on ways in which the
company could show the Public Utility Commission that employees at the
new plant did not waste or misappropriate money 15' Nordling learned that
the private attorney had suggested that the company implement a security
initiative m which Northern States would monitor the personal lives of
employees lured to work at the new plant. " Nordling believed that
company surveillance of employees in their homes was illegal. 6' Acting
upon tis belief, Nordling objected to the plan and then reported the
proposed security initiative to the general manager. 62 Eventually, the
company abandoned the security plan. 163 After this incident, the company
discharged Nordling without warning."
Nordling alleged retaliatory discharge under the state's whistleblower
statute and breach of contract, as well as several other claims, in his suit
against Northern States. 165 The Minnesota Supreme Court first addressed
Michaelson's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Id. at 176-82.
154. 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991).
155. Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 499 (Minn. 1991)
(holding that corporate counsel is not prohibited from bringing wrongful discharge action
based on implied contract).
156. Id.
157 Id.
158. Id. at 500.
159. Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 465 N.W.2d 81, 83 (Minn. Ct. App.),
rev'd, 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991).





165. Id. at 500; see Mm. STAT. § 181.932(1)(a) (1993) (providing whistleblower statute
that prohibits retaliatory discharge). In addition to his breach of contract and retaliatory
discharge claims, Nordling alleged that Northern States breached its covenant of good faith
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Nordling's breach of contract claim.'66 Nordling argued that the court
should imply the company's disrmssal procedures, contained in the
employee handbook, into Nordling's employment agreement.' 67 Because
Northern States neglected to follow the procedural steps for discharge
outlined in the handbook, Nordling asserted that Northern States breached
its employment contract with him.16 The court recognized that an in-house
attorney experiences overlapping roles as both an employee and an
attorney 169 The court accepted that, .as a general rule, a client may
discharge his attorney at any time without being liable for breach of
contract damages. 7 0
and fairness. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court failed to clarify whether the state recognizes
an action based on a covenant of good faith and fairness implied both in-law and in-fact. Id.
at 503. However, the court briskly disposed of the issue in this case by stating that, as a
matter of law, no covenant could exist in this situation. Id. Nordling also asserted a
defamation cause of action, but the Minnesota Supreme Court never addressed this claim
because the trial court dismissed the claim on a summary judgment motion. Id. at 500.
Additionally, Nordling alleged that two company employees tortiously interfered with his
employment contract. Id. The court accepted Nordling's tortious interference claim. Id.
at 505. The Minnesota Supreme Court stated that a tortious interference cause of action could
proceed even if a discharged employee's contractual argument failed and the court classified
the person as an at-will employee. Id. A tortious interference claim asserts that a third party
interfered with the contractual relations between an employer and an employee. Id., see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF TORTS § 766 (1979) (stating that one who intentionally interferes
with performance of contract between another and third person can be liable for pecuniary
loss resulting from third party's failure to perform contract). An attorney-client relationship
cannot serve as a defense to a tortious interference claim. Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 505.
Attorney-client privilege does not apply in this type of action because the defendants are third
parties and are not the attorney's clients. Id. Generally, courts hold that a party cannot
interfere with his own contract. Id., see Bouten v Richard Miller Homes, Inc., 321 N.W.2d
895, 901 (Minn. 1982) (stating that defendant's breach of his own contract with plaintiff is
not actionable). If a corporate employee dismisses a subordinate as part of his company
duties, no tortious interference action lies in that conduct. Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 505-06.
On the other hand, a discharged employee may maintain an action for tortious interference
if the superior acted outside of the scope of his corporate duties. Id. at 506; Bouten, 321
N.W.2d at 900-01. Essentially, a superior acts outside of his corporate duties when the
superior fires another employee as part of a personal vendetta. Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at
506. Ultimately, the court dismissed one count of Nordling's claim of tortious interference
and remanded the other count to the trial court. Id. at 507
166. Id. at 500-02; see supra part MI.A (explaining implied contract claims of wrongful
discharge).
167 Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 502.
168. Id. at 503.
169. Id. at 501.
170. Id., see Lawler v Dunn, 176 N.W 989, 990 (Minn. 1920) (giving clients
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Although it recogmzed the right of a client to discharge counsel, 171 the
Minnesota Supreme Court found that the in-house counsel's role as a
corporate employee also deserved recogmtion. 72 As a result, the court
reached a compromise decision by allowing in-house attorneys to bring
breach of contract actions, based on provisions in employee handbooks,
against their former employers, but permitting these claims only when the
attorneys would not reveal confidential commuications between the
attorney and client as evidence in the case. 173 The Minnesota Supreme
Court ultimately rejected Nordling's retaliatory discharge claim because
Nordling had failed to identify any state or federal rule or law that
Northern States had violated by discharging Nordling. "74 Consequently,
Nordling's claim did not fall within the protection of the state's wustle-
blower statute.
17 1
In Herbster v North American Co. for Life & Health Insurance,'76 the
Illinois Appellate Court, like th& Nordling court, stressed the importance
of preserving client confidences. 177  In Herbster, the court examined
whether an in-house attorney could sue his employer under a retaliatory
discharge cause of action after the company disnmssed the attorney for
refusing to destroy documents requested by discovery motions in pending
lawsuits. 7 ' Robert Herbster worked for the North American Company for
Life and Health Insurance (North American) as the company's chief legal
officer and as vice president of North American's legal department.1
79
North American employed Herbster under an oral employment contract that
either party could terminate at-will. 8
unfettered right to discharge their attorneys). If a client no longer trusts his attorney, whether
for good reasons or not, then the client must be permitted to discharge the attorney.
Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 501.
171. Nordling, 478 N.W.2d at 501.
172. Id. at 502.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 504.
175. Id., see MINN. STAT. § 181.932(1)(a) (1993) (prohibiting retaliatory discharge);
supra note 149 (providing text of statute).
176. 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
177 Herbster v North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E. 343, 346 (Il1. App.
Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (Ill.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
178. Id. at 344.
179. Id.
180. Id. But see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b) (1992)
(allowing attorney to withdraw only if withdrawal can occur without material adverse effect
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Herbster alleged that North American fired him because he refused to
destroy documents that parties suing North American sought through
discovery 181 These documents contained damaging information about
North American.182 If he had destroyed the information, Herbster believed
that he would have committed a fraud on a federal court and, consequently,
would have violated the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility 183
The appellate court explained the appropriate test in retaliatory
discharge actions8 4 and then examined the development of retaliatory dis-
charge.8 5 The court determined that a retaliatory discharge plaintiff must
prove that the employer discharged the employee in retaliation for the
employee's activities and that the employee's discharge contravened a
clearly mandated public policy "86 The Herbster court concluded that
Herbster's case provided ample evidence to meet the required public policy
considerations.8 7 If Herbster had destroyed the documents requested
through discovery, he would have violated state supreme court rules,'
on interests of client or for other causes listed in rule); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RspONSImm DR 2-110(C) (1983) (disallowing attorney withdrawal from matters pending
litigation or from other matters unless client insists on engaging in inappropriate behavior
outlined in disciplinary rule).
181. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
182. Id. The information included in the documents supported allegations of fraud in
North American's sale of flexible annuities. Id.
183. Id., see ILL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1-102 (1980) (prohib-
iting attorney from engaging in misconduct, including acts of dishonesty and acts prejudicial
to administration of justice), replaced by ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4
(1993); id. Rule 7-102(a)(3) (prohibiting attorney from knowingly concealing information that
law requires him to reveal), replaced by ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3
(1993); id. Rule 7-109(a) (prohibiting attorney from suppressing evidence that he is legally
required to reveal), replaced by ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1993).
184. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 344; see supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text
(discussing necessary elements of retaliatory discharge action); supra part II.B (explaining
retaliatory discharge).
185. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 345.
186. Id. at 344.
187 Id.
188. Id., see ILL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1-102 (1980) (prohib-
iting attorney from engaging in misconduct, including acts of dishonesty and acts prejudicial
to administration ofjustice), replaced by ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4
(1993); id. Rule 7-102(a)(3) (prohibiting attorney from knowingly concealing information that
law requires him to reveal), replaced by ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3
(1993); id. Rule 7-109(a) (prohibiting attorney from suppressing evidence that he is legally
required to reveal), replaced by ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 (1993).
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE FOR IN-HOUSE ATTORNEYS
obstructed justice,189 and undermined state discovery policies.'90 Although
the public policy issues concerned the court, the Herbster court focused on
whether an in-house counsel's status as an attorney precluded him from
bringing a retaliatory discharge suit against Is former employer.1 91
Herbster attempted to frame his role with North American as that of
an employee rather than that of an attorney " However, the appellate
court refused to separate Herbster's roles and deterrmned that an.m-house
counsel's roles of employee and attorney are intertwined." Because an in-
house attorney must abide by the Illinois Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, the Herbster court decided that allowing the retaliatory discharge tort
would strain the confidential relationship between an attorney and his
client. 94 The court, therefore, declined to recogmze the tort of retaliatory
discharge for in-house attorneys. 95
In Balla v Gambro, Inc. ,196 the Illinois Supreme Court followed the
decision of the Herbster court by refusing to allow in-house attorneys to
maintain retaliatory discharge actions." 9 Gambro, Inc. (Gambro) distrib-
uted various types of medical equipment.'98 Roger Balla worked as an in-
house attorney for Gambro. 199 The controversy between Balla and Gambro
arose when Balla received a letter from Gambro's foreign manufacturer that
stated that a certain shipment of equipment was faulty and might harm
patients who used the machines.'0 Because Balla's responsibilities included
compliance with federal, state, and local laws and regulations affecting the
company's operations and products, Balla informed Gambro's president
189. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
190. Id., see Consolidation Coal Co. v Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250, 251-58 (111.
1982) (describing discovery process in Illinois and discussing impact of work-product doctrine
on discovery materials).
191. Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 344.
192. Id. at 346.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 348.
195. Id. at 346.
196. 584 N.E.2d 104 (111. 1991).
197 Balla v Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 108 (111. 1991) (declining to recognize
retaliatory discharge tort for in-house attorneys)
198. Id. at 105. Gambro's distribution of dialyzers was at issue in this case. Id.
Dialyzers filter toxic substances and excess fluid from the blood of patients who suffer from
impaired kidney function. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 106.
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that the impending shipment of medical equipment failed to comply with
applicable United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) regula-
tions."° Although Balla told Gambro's president to reject the shipment, the
president decided to accept the equipment despite the known defect.2 2
Shortly after tls disagreement, the, president fired Balla.2"3 Subsequently,
Balla informed the FDA about the faulty equipment and the FDA confis-
cated the shipment.2°
Balla brought suit against Gambro and alleged that the company had
wrongfully discharged him.2 5 The court began by stating that Illinois gen-
erally allowed employers to discharge employees at-will. 6 The Balla
court then determined the sufficiency of Balla's retaliatory discharge
claim.2 7 The court concluded that Gambro had discharged Balla in retal-
201. Id. at 105-06; see Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 21 U.S.C. § 331(a)-(C)
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) (describing prohibited acts relating to manufacture and sale of
medical equipment); 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.150 to 820.198 (1994) (listing applicable rules for
manufacture and sale of medical equipment); see also Illinois Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
ILLANN. STAT. ch. 561/, para. 503-503.3 (Smith-Hurd 1985) (describing state prohibition
of adulterated devices) (current version at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 410, para. 620/3 to 620/3.3
(Smith-Hurd 1993)).
202. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 106.
203. Id.
204. Id., see 21 U.S.C. § 334(a)(1) (allowing FDA to seize adulterated device introduced
into interstate commerce).
205. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 106. The lower court developed a three-part test to determine
whether an attorney had standing to bring a retaliatory discharge action. Balla v Gambro,
560 N.E.2d 1043, 1046 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). First, if the attorney's discharge resulted from
information that he gained through his nonlegal tasks, then the discharge would not threaten
the attorney-client relationship because the plaintiff would not disclose confidential mforma-
tion at trial. Id. The appellate court determined that if an attorney satisfied this prong of the
test, he would have standing to sue his employer. Id. If a court cannot determine whether
an in-house attorney's discharge resulted from information that he gamed in his nonattorney
role, however, then the court must ask whether the attorney learned the relevant information
as part of the attorney-client relationship and whether the information was privileged. Id.
If the court answers either of these questions negatively, then the attorney has standing to sue
his employer. Id. However, if the court determines that an attorney-client privilege existed,
then the suit may proceed only if the client waived the privilege. Id. Finally, even if an
attorney learned the relevant information in the course of representation, the information was
privileged, and the client did not waive the privilege, the court must determine whether any
countervailing public policies favor the disclosure of the information. Id.
206. Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 107; see Fellhauer v City of Geneva, 568 N.E.2d 870, 875
(111. 1991) (stating that Illinois generally follows principle that employer may discharge
employee at any time and for any reason); Barr v Kelso-Burnett Co., 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356
(111. 1985) (same).
207 Balla, 584 N.E.2d at 107
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iation for his activities and that this discharge contravened public policy. 8
In examining Balla's retaliatory discharge claim, the court concentrated on
the ethical considerations of attorneys and declined to extend the availabil-
ity of the retaliatory discharge tort to in-house counsel.20 9 The court found
that protecting the lives and the property of citizens constituted an
important public policy 210 However, the court stated that an in-house
counsel's ethical obligations already adequately safeguarded the public
policy, and, therefore, the court did not need to extend the tort of
retaliatory discharge to in-house counsel to promote public policy 211 The
Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct protected the state's public policy
interests because the ethical rules required Balla to report Gambro's
conduct to the appropriate authorities.2" 2 The Supreme Court of Illinois
stated that the purpose behind allowing retaliatory discharge actions was to
encourage employees to safeguard the public by reporting employer
misconduct.213 Therefore, the Balla court refused to extend the public
policy exception to allow retaliatory discharge suits by in-house attorneys
because Balla's adherence to the ethical rules already satisfied the purpose
of retaliatory discharge suits.214 The court also denied Balla's action
because it was concerned that attorneys' retaliatory discharge actions would
cause a breakdown of trust in the attorney-client relationship.215
The remaining two wrongful discharge cases that rn-house attorneys
have brought are distinct from those cases previously discussed. The plain-
tiff in Mourad v Automobile Club Insurance Ass'n 2l6 did not attempt to as-
sert a retaliatory discharge tort claim. 17 Rather, Mourad brought a breach
208. Id.
209. Id. at 108.
210. Id. at 107-08.
211. Id. at 108-09.
212. Id. at 109.
213. Id. at 108.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 109-10. The Balla court stated that regardless of the economic and emotional
strata that an rn-house attorney endures when leaving the representation of a corporation, an
in-house attoney may not sue his former client for damages in situations where ethical
obligations required the attorney to withdraw. Id. at 110.
216. 465 N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991).
217 Mourad v Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395, 397 (Mich. Ct. App.)
(allowing in-house attorney to recover against employer under breach of just-cause contract
theory), appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1991). Mourad asserted several theories
of recovery. Id. In his complaint he alleged: breach of a just-cause contract, retalia-
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of contract action against his employer.2"' The court distinguished Mourad
from Willy, Herbster, and Parker v M & T Chemicals, Inc.219 by noting
that Mourad involved the parties' creation of contractual rights rather than
public policy restrictions on employment termination."'
In Mourad, Roger Mourad supervised the legal department of the
Automobile Club Insurance Association (Auto Club) from August 1980
until March 1983.221 Mourad exercised broad authority both in legal and
21in administrative areas. 222 In March, Auto Club demoted Mourad to the
position of executive attorney in charge of handling first-party catastrophic
claims.223 Mourad's supervisor claimed that he demoted Mourad because
Mourad had difficulty implementing Auto Club's policies and could not
contain costs effectively in the legal department. 4 A nonattorney assumed
the duties of Mourad's former supervisory position. 2' Approximately one
year after his demotion, Mourad resigned from his job with Auto Club. 6
Mourad sued Auto Club and asserted claims of breach of contract,
constructive discharge, retaliatory demotion, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.227 Mourad contended that Auto Club demoted him
because he had refused to engage in the illegal and unethical behavior that
several nonattorneys in the company had suggested. 2 1 Mourad argued that
Auto Club breached the just-cause employment contract formed between
the parties. 29 Auto Club, in turn, asserted that Mourad's status as an
attorney precluded his breach of contract claim." The court adopted the
tory demotion and constructive discharge, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and conspiracy to commit retaliatory demotion or intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Id.
218. Id.
219. 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1989); see infra notes 237-60 and
accompanying text (discussing Parker).
220. Mourad, 465 N.W.2d at 399







228. Id. The Mourad court's opinion failed to provide examples of the potentially illegal
and unethical acts proposed by Auto Club employees. Id.
229. Id. at 398.
230. Id.
1028
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE FOR IN-HOUSE ATTORNEYS
theory that an employer's statements of company procedure and policy
allowing the company to discharge employees only for cause can create
enforceable contract rights.23 ' Based on Auto Club's policy manual and
pamphlets, the jury in Mourad determined that a just-cause contract existed
and that Auto Club breached the contract by demoting Mourad for refusing
to violate the Michigan Code of Professional Conduct. 3 2 Thus, the jury
found that Auto Club demoted Mourad without just cause and that the
company's actions constructively discharged Mourad."3  The appellate
court accepted these findings of the jury and rejected Auto Club's argument
that Mourad's status as an attorney should preclude is claim of breach of
just-cause contract.2" Additionally, the Mourad court stated that a plaintiff
cannot maintain simultaneously wrongful discharge actions m contract and
m tort when the actions arise from the same set of facts.23 5 In this case, the
court permitted Mourad to recover on the just-cause contract theory and
declined to decide whether the court would recogmze retaliatory discharge
actions brought by in-house counsel absent breach of contract claims.
236
Parker v M & T Chermcals, Inc. 7 differs from the other in-house
attorney cases because the dismissed in-house attorney brought suit against
his former employer under a whistleblower statute, the Conscientious
Employee Protection Act (Act),238 rather than under the common law 239
231. Id., seeToussaintv. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (Mich. 1980)
(holding that employee can legally enforce employment contract that employer can terminate
only for just cause). A jury decides whether a just-cause contract exists based upon the facts
of the case. Mourad, 465 N.W.2d at 398.
232. Mourad, 465 N.W.2d at 398. See generally MICH. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT (1986) (setting forth standard of conduct for attorneys).
233. Mourad, 465 N.W.2d at 398; see Fischhaber v General Motors Corp., 436
N.W.2d 386, 389 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (stating that proposed demotion is not same as
tenmination for purposes of wrongful discharge claim), appeal denied without opinion, (Mich.
1989). The Mourad court explained constructive discharge by stating: "A constructive
discharge occurs when an employer deliberately makes an employee's working conditions so
intolerable that the employee is forced into an involuntary resignation or when working
conditions become so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in the employee's shoes
would fee compelled to resign." Mourad, 465 N.W.2d at 398.
234. Mourad, 465 N.W.2d at 398. Auto Club argued that a client has a right to
discharge his attorney with or without cause. Id.
235. Id. at 401.
236. Id.
237 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div 1989).
238. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to 34:19-8 (West 1988 & Supp. 1994).
239. See Parker v. M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215, 216, 222 (N.J. Super Ct. App.
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M & T Chemicals, Inc. (M & T) developed and sold chemicals for the
electronics and other industries.24 Sheldon Parker worked as the Director
of Patents at M & T for seven years. Although Parker contended that he
received positive performance evaluations, M & T abruptly demoted him
to Assistant General Patent Counsel. 242
Parker alleged that his demotion occurred in connection with M & T's
desire to acquire the technology to manufacture a particular chermcal
known as a methyltin stabilizer. 243 The incident began when Parker re-
ceived a telephone call from another M & T employee in which Parker
learned that confidential documents containing a competitor's trade secrets
about methyltin stabilizer development were being sent to him for M & T's
use.244 Parker discovered that a former M & T employee worked for the
competitor and had obtained these documents from a federal district court
m which litigation against the competitor was pending. 245 The judge m that
case, however, had imposed a protective order that prohibited the release
of these documents. 246 Parker expressed his objections about using the
competitor's trade secrets in a written memorandum sent to Gordon
-Andrews, the vice president, secretary, and general counsel of M & T 247
Parker gave the documents to Andrews without reading them and urged
M & T to obtain court approval before using the confidential informa-
tion.24 After Parker sent the memorandum to Andrews, M & T retaliated
by verbally reprimanding and then demoting Parker.249 Parker's supervisor
indicated that he would fire Parker if Parker "rocked the boat."2' 0
Eventually, Parker resigned from his job at M & T "'
Div 1989) (allowing in-house attorney to sue employer under whistleblower statute).
240. Id. at 216.
241. Id.





247 Id. at 217-18.
248. Id. at 218.
249 Id. Parker alleged that M & T created an "intolerable work environment that
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The New Jersey Superior Court began its analysis by examining the
Act.' The Act upholds New Jersey's belief in the principle that, although
an employer has a right to discharge an employee, an employee has the
freedom to decline to perform an act that would constitute a violation of a
clear mandate of public policy 13 Retaliatory action under the whistle-
blower statute includes the discharge, suspension, or demotion of an
employee, or other negative action taken against an employee. 4  If an
employer violates the provisions of the whistleblower statute, then the
discharged employee may sue the employer and seek injunctive relief,
reinstatement, compensation for lost wages, benefits, costs, attorney's fees,
punitive damages, and an assessment of civil fines that are payable to the
state. 5
M & T claimed that in-house attorneys could not proceed under the
Act because the Act unconstitutionally impinged on the New Jersey
Supreme Court's power to regulate the conduct of attorneys and would
compromise the attorney-client relationship between Parker and M & T 256
The New Jersey Superior Court, stating that the Act did not require an ex-
ception for rn-house attorneys in order to survive a constitutional challenge,
rejected M & T's constitutional assertion. 7 The court also stated that an
252. Id., see Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-1 to
34:19-8 (1988 & Supp. 1994).
253. Parker, 566 A.2d at 218; see N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:19-3(c)(3).
254. Parker, 566 A.2d at 219; see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-2(e) (prohibiting retaliation
against employee for reporting illegal acts). The whistleblower statute prohibits retaliatory
action against an employee who "[d]iscloses or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a
public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that the employee reasonably
believes is m violation of a law, or a rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to law." Id.
§ 34:19-3(a). The statute also forbids retaliatory action against an employee who
objects to, or refuses to participate in any activity, policy or practice which the
employee reasonably believes: (1) is in violation of law, or a rule or regulation
promulgated pursuant to law; (2) is fraudulent or criminal; or (3) is incompatible
with a clear mandate of public policy concerning the public health, safety or
welfare.
Id. § 34:19-3(c).
255. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:19-5. The court alluded that if Parker had sought
reinstatement with M & T rather than damages, his cause of action would have been denied.
See Parker, 566 A.2d at 220 (mentioning that rn-house attorney sued for money damages
only).
256. Parker, 566 A.2d at 219. M & T asserted that employers may discharge attorneys
at any time with or without cause. Id., see N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.16(a)(3) (1991) (requiring attorney to withdraw from representation if discharged by client).
257 Parker, 566 A.2d at 220.
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employer retained the right to file an ethics complaint against the dismissed
attorney if the attorney disclosed client confidences in violation of the New
Jersey Rules of Professional Conduce"8 while pursuing his statutory
retaliatory discharge action. 59 Therefore, the court refused to dismiss
Parker's complaint and determined that in-house counsel could bring
wrongful discharge actions under New Jersey's whistleblower statute.2"
These select cases illustrate courts' reluctance to grant relief to
corporate counsel who bring retaliatory discharge tort actions.2 ' The
ovemding reasons for this reluctance are to protect attorney-client con-
fidentiality 2 and to promote trust in the attorney-client relationship.26 Al-
though a few courts have allowed in-house attorneys to recover from their
employers in breach of contract actions2 or under a state statute,2 65 Cali-
258. Id., see N.J. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1991) (prohibiting
disclosure of client confidences absent specific circumstances).
259. Parker, 566 A.2d at 220.
260. Id. at 222.
261. Seegenerally Willy v Coastal Corp., 647 F Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (refusing
to allow in-house attorney's retaliatory discharge suit), rev'dfor lack offederaljunsdiction,
855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); Balla v Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (I1. 1991) (same);
Herbster v North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(same), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (Ill.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Nordling
v Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991) (same); Michaelson v
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (same), aff'd, 479
N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992); McGonagle v Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989) (same), appeal denied, 575 A.2d 115 (1990).
262. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992) (stating that
information gained in course of attorney-client relationship is confidential); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1983) (same); Kim, supra note 3, at 903 (stating
that possible negative effect on attorney-client relationship is primary reason to reject
retaliatory discharge action for in-house counsel). See generally Willy v Coastal Corp., 647
F Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (refusing to allow retaliatory discharge tort m order to
preserve client confidences), rev'dfor lack offederaljurisdiction, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir.
1988); Balla v Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (111. 1991) (same); Herbster v North Am. Co.
for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Il1. App. Ct. 1986) (same), appeal denied, 508
N.E.2d 728 (11.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Nordling v Northern States Power
Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991) (same).
263. SeeBallav. Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 110 (il1. 1991) (stating that permitting
retaliatory discharge action for in-house counsel could have undesired chilling effect on
communication between attorney and client); Herbster v North Am. Co. for Life & Health
Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (I1. App. Ct. 1986) (stating that preserving mutual trust between
attorney and client is reason not to expand retaliatory discharge tort), appeal denied, 508
N.E.2d 728 (Il.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
264. See Mourad v Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465 N.W.2d 395, 401 (Mich. Ct.
App.) (allowing in-house attorney's breach of contract claim against employer), appeal
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fornia became the first state to allow corporate counsel to pursue retaliatory
discharge tort actions against employers.
266
V The California Supreme Court's Recent Decision
Allowing the Retaliatory Discharge Tort Cause of Action for
Dismissed In-House Attorneys
A. The Facts of the Case and the Court's Analysis
In General Dynamics Corp. v Superior Court,267 Andrew Rose, the
plaintiff, began his career with the General Dynamics Corporation (General
Dynamics) as a contract admlnstrator.268 Rose received various promo-
tions and commendations throughout is fourteen years of employment with
General Dynamics.2 69 Rose anticipated becoming a division vice president
and general counsel, but General Dynamics suddenly and unexpectedly
fired Rose.27 General Dynamics stated that the corporation dismissed Rose
because it lost confidence in Rose's ability to represent the company's
interests vigorously 271 Rose alleged in his complaint, however, that
General Dynamics actually fired him because he had headed an investiga-
tion into employee drug use that led to the discharge of more than sixty
General Dynamics employees,272 because he had protested the company's
refusal to investigate the mysterious "bugging" of the chief of security's
office,273 and because he had contended that the company's salary policy
violated the Fair Labor Standards Act.274
denied, 478 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1991); Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d
498, 499 (Minn. 1991) (same).
265. See Parker v. M&TChems., Inc., 556 A.2d 215, 222 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div
1989) (permitting in-house counsel to recover under state whistleblower statute).
266. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503 (Cal. 1994) (en
banc) (recognizing tort of retaliatory discharge as viable cause of action by in-house
attorneys)..
267 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994) (en banc).




272. Id. at 490-91.
273. Id. at 491. The bugging of the chief of security's office was allegedly a criminal
offense. Id. Also, because one of the parties was a defense contractor, the action would be
considered a breach of national security Id.
274. Id., see Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 15(a)(3), as amended, 29 U.S.C.
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Rose's suit against General Dynamics asserted two theories of relief:
implied contract and retaliatory discharge. 5  General Dynamics, relying
on the California Supreme Court's determination in Fracasse v Brent,
27 6
claimed that Rose could not bring a wrongful discharge action under any
theory because a client has an unfettered right to discharge an attorney at
any time and for any reason.7 7 The General Dynamics court responded to
§§ 213(a)(1), 215(a)(3), 216(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (providing applicable compensation
standards for employees).
275. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 491.
276. 494 P.2d 9 (Cal. 1972).
277 General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 492; see Fracasse v Brent, 494 P.2d 9, 13 (Cal.
1972) (stating that client may discharge attorney with or without cause); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.16 cmt. 4 (1992) (stating that client may discharge
attorney at any time with or without cause). In Fracasse, Ray Raka Brent hired George
Fracasse to represent her in a personal injury action. Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 10. The parties
entered into a contingency fee agreement that provided Fracasse with 33.33% of any
settlement made more than one month prior to trial and 40% of Brent's recovery received
after that time. Id. Before Brent recovered any compensation, she discharged Fracasse. Id.
Subsequently, Fracasse filed a declaratory judgment action against Brent, alleging that
Fracasse's discharge lacked good cause and that Brent had breached the contingency fee
agreement by firing Fracasse. Id. The court first asserted that a discharged attorney could
not recover on a contingency fee contract prior to plaintiffs recovery in her personal injury
action. Id. at 11, see Brown v Connolly, 83 Cal. Rptr. 158, 161 (1969) (stating that
attorney's cause of action to recover fee from contingency agreement cannot arise until
happening of contingency). Dismissed attorneys generally recover for their services under
quantum meruit. Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 11. Quantum meruit compensates attorneys for the
value of their services without subjecting the plaintiff to the possibility of paying two
contingency fees upon dismissal of the plaintiffs first attorney Id. at 12; see Salopek v
Schoemann, 124 P.2d 21, 24 (Cal. 1942) (discussing merits of awarding quantum meruit
rather than contract price). Although a client may be liable to his dismissed attorney for the
value of the attorney's services, a client has an absolute right to discharge an attorney at any
time with or without cause. Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 13; see Gage v Atwater, 68 P 581, 582
(Cal. 1902) (stating that client has absolute right to discharge attorney); see also CAL. CODE
Civ PRO. § 284 (1982 & Supp. 1995) (permitting change of attorneys in action or proceeding
upon consent of both client and attorney, or upon court order). Additionally, a client's
discharge of an attorney does not constitute a breach of contract because the client's right to
discharge the attorney is a basic term of the contract, implied by law because of the
relationship between the parties. Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 13; see Martin v Camp, 114 N.E.
46, 48 (N.Y 1916) (explaining that client's right to discharge attorney is implied in contract).
However, the New York court stated that quantum meruit recovery daes not apply to
attorneys working under general retainer agreements. Martin, 114 N.E. at 48. Ultimately,
the California Supreme Court developed a special rule of compensation for discharged
attorneys who entered contingency fee arrangements with their former clients. Fracasse, 494
P.2d at 14. Because the attorney originally agreed to take the chance of recovering no fee
if his client lost the case, the court held that a discharged attorney's suit for compensation
arises only after the contingency occurs. Id. Hence, if the client recovers no judgment with
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the corporation's contention by agreeing that a client possesses the right to
discharge an attorney 278 However, the court stated that the client's right
to discharge did not release the client from compensating the dismissed
attorney 279 The court distinguished Fracasse because Fracasse concerned
a contingency fee contract."' Although a client may not have to compen-
sate a discharged attorney retained under a contingency fee agreement if the
client loses his case,"s the California Supreme Court declined to extend this
idea to noncontingency fee representation in the corporate context.2"
The General Dynamics court began its analysis by examnig Rose's
implied-m-fact contract claim.2"3 The court concluded that Rose's com-
plaint showed a pattern of conduct, including several oral representations
by the corporation, that created Rose's reasonable expectation that General
Dynamics would not terminate him without good cause. 284 Therefore,
Rose's pleadings provided enough information to survive General Dy-
nanuc's demurrer." 5 The court stated that no policy reason existed to
prohibit a corporate attorney from bringing an implied-m-fact contract
claim against his former employer.286 The California Supreme Court
emphasized that courts generally hold parties to their bargain and that this
situation provided no exception to that general rule.28 7 Additionally, the
court concluded that an implied-in-fact contract -claim does not implicate
attorney-client confidentiality concerns and therefore can proceed.2 8
The General Dynamics court then addressed Rose's retaliatory dis-
charge claim.2 9 Rose alleged that General Dynamics discharged lm in
her new attorney, then the discharged attorney will not recover either. Id.
278. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 494-95.
279. Id. at 495. Depending on the type of action pursued, discharged attorneys may re-
cover lost wages and related damages under an implied-in-fact contract claim or tort damages
under a retaliatory discharge claim. Id. The General Dynamics court stated, however, that
reinstatement is not an available remedy for a discharged in-house attorney Id.
280. Id. at 492-93; Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 10.
281. Fracasse, 494 P.2d at 14.
282. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 493.
283. Id. at 495.
284. Id., see Foley v Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 383-84 (Cal. 1988)
(discussing implied contract terms derived from course of conduct).
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violation of constitutional or statutory provisions of state law that expressed
the state's fundamental public policy 290 The court distinguished implied-in-
fact contract claims from retaliatory discharge claims by stating that
implied-m-fact contract claims arise from the conduct and expectations of
the parties in the employment relationship, whereas retaliatory discharge
claims based on violations of public policy exist as a matter of law 291 in
retaliatory discharge cases, the employer has a duty implied-in-law to
operate the company's business in accord with the state's public policy 292
California common law imposes two restraints on retaliatory discharge
claims. 293 First, the public policy at issue must be fundamental and firmly
established.294 Second, the employer's conduct must violate a policy that
is truly public m nature.295 True public policy conveys a duty to the benefit
of the public at large as opposed to a particular employer or employee.296
Additionally, the remedy in retaliatory discharge tort actions compensates
the individual plaintiff and indirectly vindicates the underlying fundamental
public policy itself.297
The General Dynamics court emphasized the importance of the public
rationale because attorneys have duties to both their clients and to their
profession. 298 Lawyers are bound to uphold professional ethical rules that
distinguish lawyers' work from nonattorneys' work.2 99 The California
Supreme Court reasoned that the law should permut corporate counsel to
claim retaliatory discharge because attorneys' work, by defimntion, affects
290. Id., see also Gantt v Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687 (Cal. 1992) (requiring
statutory or constitutional basis for public policy).
291. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 497
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id., see Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield, 610 P.2d 1330, 1331-32 (Cal. 1980) (stating
that asserted public policy in retaliatory discharge action must be firmly established and
fundamental); see also Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684-85 (discussing need for clear statement of
public policy); Foley v Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 379 (Cal. 1988) (stating that
retaliatory discharge plaintiff must allege that his discharge violated basic public policy).
295. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 497; see Gantt v Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684
(Cal. 1992) (stating that policy at issue must be public); Foley, 765 P.2d at 380 & n.12
(stating that retaliatory discharge plaintiff must assert public policy).
296. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 497; see Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684 (stating that public
policy affects society rather than individual); Foley, 765 P.2d at 380 (stating that when
asserted policy serves only private interest of employer, then public policy is not asserted).
297 General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 497
298. Id. at 497-98.
299 Id.
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the public interest, and because in-house attorneys are more likely to
experience conflicts between corporate goals and professional norms than
their nonattorney colleagues. 3"
The General Dynamics court addressed the ethical concerns surround-
mg the retaliatory discharge tort for in-house attorneys raised by the courts
in Balla, Herbster, and Willy 301 In response to the reasoning in those
cases, the court stated:
Granted the priest-like license to receive the most intimate and damning
disclosures of the client, granted the sanctity of the professional privilege,
granted the uiquely influential position attorneys occupy m our society,
it is precisely because of that role that attorneys should be accorded a
retaliatory discharge remedy m those instances in which mandatory ethical
norms embodied m the Rules of Professional Conduct collide with
illegitimate demands of the employer and the attorney insists on adherng
to his or her clear professional duty.3"
The General Dynamics court asserted that permitting corporate counsel to
bring retaliatory discharge claims would advance the public policies that the
ethical rules seek to protect.0 3 The court determined that allowing
retaliatory discharge claims would give attorneys greater incentive to
confront their employers' improper business practices rather than remaining
silent out of fear for job security 3' Therefore, the court decided to permit
in-house counsel to plead the retaliatory discharge cause of action because
the availability of the tort action would help corporate counsel promote the
fundamental public policies reflected in the ethical rules. 05
B. The California Supreme Court's Requirements for Retaliatory
Discharge Actions Brought by In-House Counsel
The California Supreme Court developed a multi-tiered test to evaluate
the validity of an rn-house attorney's claim of retaliatory discharge. 3 6 To
300. Id.
301. See supra part IV (discussing Balla, Herbster, and Willy).
302. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 501.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 503. The California Supreme Court recognized, and attempted to incorporate
into its decision, the concerns about the fiduciary nature of the attorney-client relationship that
the Illinois courts expressed in Balla and Herbster See supra part IV (discussing Balla and
Herbster).
306. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 502-03.
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apply this test, a court must first determine whether a company dismissed its
corporate counsel for abiding by a mandatory ethical obligation that a
professional rule or a statute prescribes. 3" The court suggested that m most
cases an employee's discharge for following a mandatory ethical obligation
would support an action for retaliatory discharge.0 8
The next level of the General Dynamics test involves ethically permis-
sible conduct rather than ethically mandated behavior.3 If an rn-house
attorney has engaged in ethically permissible conduct, then a court must
examnne two issues.3 0 First, the court must decide whether the standards set
forth in Gantt v Sentry Insurance3M would allow a nonattorney employee to
bring a retaliatory discharge action based on the employer's conduct.312
307 Id. at 502.
308. Id. at 503.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992).
312. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503. See generally Gantt v Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d
680 (Cal. 1992) (clarifying appropriate standards for retaliatory discharge actions m Cali-
fornia). In Gantt, the California Supreme Court considered whether an employee whose em-
ployer discharged him for supporting a co-worker's sexual harassment claim could bring a
retaliatory discharge tort action under the public policy exception to the employment at-will
doctrine. Id. at 681. The court also determined whether remedies under the state's workers'
compensation act preempted Gantt's common-law tort claim. Id. Vincent Gantt worked as
a sales manager for a branch office of Sentry Insurance (Sentry). Id. at 682. The conflict
between Gantt and Sentry arose shortly after the company hired Joyce Bruno to serve as a
liaison between trade associations and two of Sentry's branch offices. Id. Gantt and another
manager supervised Bruno's work. Id. After a short time with the company, Bruno reported
to Gantt that the manager of the other branch office had sexually harassed her. Id. Gantt
reported the incidents of harassment to the appropriate company personnel. Id. Eventually,
the company transferred Bruno to a sales representative position and then dismissed her one
month later. Id. Bruno filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing (DFEH) that alleged sexual harassment and the failure of Sentry management to re-
spond to complaints about her harassment. Id. Sentry's in-house counsel conducted an
investigation into the matter and urged Gantt to retract his statement that supported Bruno's
sexual harassment claim. Id. at 682-83. An investigator from DFEH interviewed Gantt
about Bruno's alleged sexual harassment. Id. at 683. After Gantt failed to alter his story as
Sentry's corporate counsel had requested, the lawyer asked the DFEH investigator why he
was not also investigating Gantt for sexually harassing Bruno. Id. The court found the law-
yer's statement to be indicative of the pressure that Sentry placed on Gantt to retract his state-
ment supporting Bruno. Id. Less than two months later, Sentry demoted Gantt to the posi-
tion of sales representative. Id. Additionally, the company refused to provide Gantt with a
listing of existing accounts, which, apparently, was a virtual necessity to perform his new job
adequately Id. The following month, Gantt accepted employment from another company
Id. Gantt alleged that Sentry constructively discharged him. Id., see also infra note 428
1038
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE FOR IN-HOUSE AYTORNEYS
Second, the court must determine whether a statutory basis exists for
departing from the requirement of confidentiality between the attorney and
client. 313 If the court finds an acceptable exception to confidentiality, the
court will allow the retaliatory discharge claim to proceed.1 4
The General Dynamics test requires that the applicable ethical code
provision or statutory provision clearly establish the ethical requirement."'
(explaining constructive discharge). The California Supreme Court analyzed the facts of
Gantt in the context of prevailing state precedent about retaliatory discharge. Gantt, 824 P.2d
at 683. The court recognized the inherent difficulty in determining whether an employee's
discharge violated public policy or if the discharge resulted from an ordinary employer-
employee dispute. Id. at 684. The Gantt court affirmed that the policy at issue must affect
society and must be fundamental. Id. at 684, 687 The court surveyed case law from various
jurisdictions to determine whether the state constitution or statutes needed to state the public
policy at issue. Id. at 684-87 The Gantt court concluded that courts evaluating wrongful
discharge claims could not declare public policy without a basis in statutory provisions or the
state constitution. Id. at 687 The court reasoned that this policy struck a balance between
the interests of society, the employer, and the employee. Id. at 687-88. The court, therefore,
upheld the jury's finding that Sentry constructively discharged Gantt in violation of a
fundamental public policy in retaliation for his refusal to testify untruthfully at the DFEH
interview. Id. at 688. The Gantt court also concluded that the applicable workers' compen-
sation act did not preempt Gantt's retaliatory discharge claim. Id. at 692.
313. General Dynanucs, 876 P.2d at 503. Statutory exceptions to the attorney-client
privilege are acceptable statutory departures from confidentiality "There is no privilege
if the lawyer reasonably believes that disclosure of any confidential communication is
necessary to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer believes is
likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm." CAL. EVID. CODE § 956.5 (West 1994)
(emphasis omitted). "Matters involving the commission of a crime or a fraud, or circum-
stances in which the attorney reasonably believes that disclosure is necessary to prevent the
commission of a criminal act likely to result in death or substantial bodilty harm, are statutory
and well-recognized exceptions to the attorney-client privilege." General Dynamics, 876
P.2d at 504. "The privilege takes flight if the relation is abused." Clark v United States,
289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933).
314. See GeneralDynanucs, 876 P.2d at 503 (discussing test to determine whether court
will permit retaliatory discharge claim by in-house counsel); see also CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 956.5 (West 1994) (providing exception to attorney-client privilege in case of mminent
death or substantial bodily harm). The General Dynamics court emphasized the importance
of preserving the fiduciary relationship between attorneys and clients. General Dynamics,
876 P.2d at 503. The court stated:
EIThe fiduciary qualities of mutual trust and confidence - can be protected from
the threat of damage by limiting judicial access to claims grounded m explicit and
unequivocal ethical norms embodied in the Rules of Professional Responsibility
and statutes, and claims which are maintainable by the nonattorney employee,
under circumstances in which the Legislature has manifested a judgment that the
principle of professional confidentiality does not apply.
Id.
315. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504.
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A plaintiff cannot bring a retaliatory discharge action based solely on
disagreements over policy 36 Additionally, the contested ethical require-
ment must be one designed to protect the interests of the public at large and
not a rule constructed only for the benefit of the attorney or the client.317
The court will not permit retaliatory discharge claims to proceed unless the
employer's acts threatened apublic policy 38
The General Dynamics test also awards trial courts considerable
discretion in deciding whether a retaliatory discharge action brought by an
in-house attorney should proceed.319 The California Supreme Court in-
structed that trial courts should apply an "array of ad hoc measures from
their equitable arsenal" to allow the in-house attorney to present necessary
proof while simultaneously protecting client confidences from disclosure.32
The General Dynamics court qualified its decision by stating that retalia-
tory discharge actions should not proceed if the necessary evidence would
breach the attorney-client privilege.32 If a dismissed in-house attorney can
prove retaliatory discharge only by breaching the attorney-client privilege,
then the court must dismiss the action.3'
V. The General Dynamics Test: Is It Effective?
A. Observations About the General Dynamics Test
In contrast to commentators who have urged the expansion of the
retaliatory discharge tort to in-house attorneys with little concern for
316. Id. at 504; see Pierce v Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 510 (N.J.
1980) (stating that disputes over discretionary acts do not form basis for public policy
exception to at-will employment rule); McGonagle v Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878,
883 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (same), appeal denied, 575 A.2d 115 (Pa. 1990).
317 General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id. The General Dynanucs court provided examples of measures contained in a trial
court's "equitable arsenal." Id. Appropriate ad hoc measures include: sealing and protective
orders, limited admissibility of evidence, limited use of testimony m subsequent proceedings,
and in camera proceedings. Id. Additionally, the General Dynamics court encouraged trial
courts to take an "aggressive managerial role" in these cases. Id.
321. Id. at 503-04.
322. Id. The court indicated that dismissing an action for breach of attorney-client
privilege at the demurrer stage seldom will be appropriate. Id. at 504. Rather, the parties
will likely litigate whether the attorney-client privilege restricts the attorney's possibility of
recovery for retaliatory discharge. Id.
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preserving client confidences,323 the California Supreme Court attempted
to respect the legitimate confidentiality concerns raised by the Balla,
Herbster, and Willy courts.324 The court developed a test that not only
assesses the strength of a retaliatory discharge plaintiff's substantive claim,
but also addresses the extent to which an attorney may divulge client con-
fidences. 3" The General Dynamics court sought to balance an attorney's
compensatory rights with is ethical duties.326
The California Supreme Court's test for in-house attorneys discharged
for following mandatory ethical obligations presents a relatively low hurdle
for plaintiffs. 27 The standard under the first prong of the test has a low
threshold because the employer likely has engaged in a hgh level of
misconduct.32 For example, if an employer ordered its in-house counsel
to commit a crime and the attorney refused to engage in that behavior, then
the attorney would have followed a mandatory ethcal obligation. 29 An in-
house attorney whose employer discharged him because of the attorney's
refusal to commit a cnmnal act could successfully bring a retaliatory
discharge action against the employer under the General Dynamics test.33°
This type of situation should receive protection under the public policy
exception because criminal acts violate clearly stated public policies under
323. See Reynolds, supra note 6, at 570 (stating that confidentiality is stressed too
much); Corello, supra note 6, at 415 (stating that courts should recognize that justifications
for absolute confidentiality are less important for in-house counsel than for other attorneys).
See generally Feliu, supra note 75 (ignoring potential confidentiality problems).
324. See supra part IV (discussing Willy, Balla, and Herbster decisions). See generally
Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (stating that attorney had ethical
obligation to withdraw from representation rather than sue former client), rev'dfor lack of
federal jurisdiction, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); Balla v Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104
(Il. 1991) (refusing to allow retaliatory discharge tort because of fear that attorney would
disclose client confidences to prove claim); Herbster v North Am. Co. for Life & Health
Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Il. App. Ct. 1986) (same), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (Ill.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
325. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 502-04 (presenting pleading test).
326. See id. (presenting pleading test).
327 See Ad. at 502-03 (stating that under most circumstances attorney would have viable
retaliatory discharge action if company discharged attorney for complying with mandatory
ethical rule).
328. See id. at 502 (providing example of employer asking attorney to commit crime).
329. Id., see MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1992) (prohibiting
attorneys from assisting client in criminal or fraudulent conduct); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBILIY DR 1-102(3), (4) (1983) (prohibiting attorneys from engaging
in fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and illegal conduct involving moral turpitude).
330. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503.
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both statutes33 and ethical norms.3 32 Many retaliatory discharge plaintiffs,
however, will not experience such clear violations of public policy 311 For
those plaintiffs, the General Dynamics test becomes much more difficult to
apply 334
If a corporation discharges an in-house attorney for complying with a
permssive ethical standard, the General Dynamics test instructs trial courts
to evaluate whether nonattorney plaintiffs would have a valid retaliatory
discharge cause of action under the standards of Gantt.335 This prong of the
test requires trial courts to construct hypothetical situations in which all of
the particular facts of the case remain the same except that the court
disregards the plaintiff's status as an attorney 336 The test next examines
whether an exception to the attorney-client privilege exists. 337 The most
common exceptions that courts have recogmzed are situations in which the
company engages in a fraudulent or a criminal act.338 If the corporation did
not commit a criminal or a fraudulent act, then the plaintiff's case may end
331. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 115 (West 1988) (stating that person who offers
false or forged records to be filed in public office has committed felony); id. § 132 (stating
that person who offers false evidence has committed felony); id. § 135 (prohibiting
destruction of evidence).
332. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4 (1992) (prohibiting
attorney from committing criminal act or from engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation); id. Rule 1.2(d) (prohibiting attorney from assisting client in criminal or
fraudulent act); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (1983)
(prohibiting attorney from engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, or m
any other illegal conduct involving moral turpitude).
333. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503 (describing standards for attorneys who
follow ethically permissible behavior).
334. See id. (stating that inquiry for attorney engaging in ethically permissible con-
duct is more complex than analysis used for attorney following ethically mandated stan-
dards).
335. Id., see supra note 312 (providing factual summary of Gantt).
336. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503 (instructing trial courts to analyze fact
situation under Gantt standards).
337 Id.
338. Id., see Clark v United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (stating that attorney-client
privilege does not protect acts of fraud); United States v United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F
Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) (stating that attorney-client privilege does not apply in cases
where client commits crime or tort); Securities & Exch. Comm'n v Harrison, 80 F Supp.
226, 230 (D.D.C. 1948) (stating that attorney-client privilege does not protect criminal or
fraudulent acts), aff'd, 184 F.2d 691 (D.C. Cir. 1950), vacated as moot, 340 U.S. 908
(1951); see also McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 95 (Edward W Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984)
(stating that no privilege applies when services of lawyer obtained to assist in perpetration of
crime or of fraud).
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at this point in the analysis. 3 The court stated that if the action breaches
the attorney-client privilege, then the presiding court should dismiss the
attorney's suit.?
The California Supreme Court should not be faulted for limiting the
use of the retaliatory discharge action by in-house counsel. The court
chose to take a policy-based approach that valued the preservation of client
confidences.4 1 Ultimately, the General Dynamics test presents a compro-
mse between two extreme positions.4 2
B. Applying the General Dynamics Test
One way in which to gauge the effectiveness of the General Dynamics
test is to apply its standards to the facts of previously discussed retaliatory
discharge actions that in-house counsel have brought.34 Herbster provides
an example of an in-house attorney ordered to engage in conduct that would
violate mandatory ethical obligations." A court would imtially evaluate
the facts of Herbster under the first prong of the General Dynamics test.
345
The court would determine whether North American discharged Herbster
because he abided by a mandatory ethical obligation set forth m a
professional rule or statute."
339. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503-04 (mandatmg dismissal of action if no
adequate exception to attorney-client privilege exists).
340. Id.
341. See id. (requiring dismissal of action if attorney would disclose client confidences
as means of proof for retaliatory discharge action).
342. CopareWillyv. Coastal Corp., 647 F Supp. 116, 118 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (stating
that attorney had ethical obligation to withdraw from representation rather than sue former
client), rev'dfor lack of federal junsdiction, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988) and Balla v
GCambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104, 109-10 (11. 1991) (refusing to allow retaliatory discharge tort
because of fear that attorney would disclose client confidences to prove claim) and Herbster
v North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 346-48 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(same), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (Ill.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987) with
Reynolds, supra note 6, at 570 (stating that confidentiality is stressed too much) and Corello,
supra note 6, at 415 (stating that courts should recognize that justifications for absolute
confidentiality are less important for in-house counsel than other attorneys) and Feliu, supra
note 75 (ignoring potential confidentiality problems).
343. See supra part IV (discussing Herbster and Nordling cases in which discharged in-
house attorneys pursued wrongful discharge actions against their employers).
344. See supra notes 176-95 and accompanying text (discussing Herbster decision).
345. See General Dynamcs, 876 P.2d at 502 (stating that first prong of General
Dynamics test applies to attorneys who engage in mandatory ethical conduct).
346. See id. (describing first stage of General Dynamics test).
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In Herbster, North American ordered Herbster to destroy requested
discovery documents.347 The Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility
prohibited this type of conduct. 8 Additionally, destroying discovery
documents would have violated a state statute by obstructing justice.' 9
Under the General Dynamics test, Herbster would satisfy the first prong of
the analysis because he refused to violate a mandatory ethical norm.35°
Herbster, therefore, could proceed with a retaliatory discharge action
against North American.3"'
If an in-house attorney engages in ethically permissible conduct,
however, the analysis becomes more complex.352 Applying this portion of
the General Dynamics test to the Nordling facts353 demonstrates the
difficulty of the analysis and the limited application of this part of the test.
As a preliminary matter, a court applying the second tier of the General
Dynamics test must determine whether the discharged attorney has engaged
in ethically permissible behavior.354
Nordling believed that Northern States planned to engage in illegal
conduct by invading the privacy of company employees and he reported
this behavior to his superiors in the company 155 Although Nordling could
raise concerns about company policy with which he disagreed, Nordling did
347 Herbster v North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (111.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987).
348. Id., see ILL. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 1-102 (1980) (prohib-
iting attorney from engaging in misconduct, including acts of dishonesty and acts prejudicial
to administration of justice), replaced by ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4
(1993); id. Rule 7-102(a)(3) (prohibiting attorney from knowingly concealing information
that law requires him to reveal), replaced by ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.3 (1993); id. Rule 7-109(a) (prohibiting attorney from suppressing evidence that he is
legally required to reveal), replaced by ILL. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3
(1993).
349. See Herbster, 501 N.E.2d at 345 (stating that Herbster would have obstructed
justice if he had destroyed requested discovery documents); see also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38,
para. 31-4(a) (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1992) (stating that destruction of evidence
constitutes obstruction ofjustice) (currently found at ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 5/31-4(a)
(Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1994)).
350. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 502-03 (explaining pleading test).
351. See id. (stating that under most circumstances attorney who met first prong of test
would succeed in retaliatory discharge claim against employer).
352. Id.
353. Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 499-500 (Minn. 1991);
see supra notes 154-75 and accompanying text (discussing Nordling decision).
354. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503.
355. Nordling, 465 N.W.2d at 500.
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not act under a mandatory ethical obligation. The General Dynamics court
stated that the contested ethical requirement must be clearly established and
that disagreements over company policy were not actionable.356 Because
Nordling did not rely on a specific ethical provision when attempting to
stop Northern States from monitoring employees' private lives, one must
speculate about an applicable ethical provision for the purposes of ttus
analysis.
Perhaps a court could find that Rule 1.13 of the Minnesota Rules of
Professional Conduct357 allowed Nordling to Inform Ins superiors about the
intended surveillance plan. However, that rule applies only if someone
within the organization violates or intends to violate a legal obligation of
the organization or to break the law ... At the pleading stage, a court may
not be able to deterimne whether a plaintiff's belief was factually correct.
If a court accepted Nordling's belief that the conduct at issue was illegal,
then Rule 1.13 would seem to provide an ethical obligation to report
potentially illegal behavior to a higher authority or to take other reasonable
steps to remedy the situation.359
If the presiding court determined that Nor dling had engaged in
ethically -permissible conduct, then the court would examine whether
Nordling could bring a retaliatory discharge claim under Gantt if he were
not an attorney 31 This layer of the test also creates problems under the
Nordling fact scenario. Gantt requires that a retaliatory discharge plaintiff
prove that his employer discharged him in retaliation for his activities361 and
that the discharge violated a public policy expressed in the state's con-
stitution or statutes.3 62 Although Nordling might be able to show that
Northern States discharged him because of his concern about the proposed
surveillance plan, Nordling failed to assert any statutory basis for his belief
that the company's proposed conduct was illegal or contrary to a stated
356. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 504.
357 See MINN. RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1993) (ex-
plaining attorney's representation of organization); see also MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (explaining attorney's representation of organization);
nfra part VII (discussing Model Rule 1.13); mfra note 402 (providing text of Model Rule
1.13).
358. MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1993).
359. Id. Rule 1.13(b).
360. General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503.
361. Gantt v Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 684, 687 (Cal. 1988); see supra note 312
(providing discussion of Gantt).
362. Gantt, 824 P.2d at 684, 687; see supra note 312 (providing discussion of Gant).
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public policy 363 Therefore, Nordling's claim would fail even if Nordling
was not an attorney '64
Assuming that Nordling had identified a public policy prohibiting the
company's proposed conduct, a presiding court would then determine
whether an exception to the attorney-client privilege would allow Nordling
to divulge client confidences in the situation.365 The facts in Nordling
preclude Nordling's disclosure of the company's plan as a basis for his
retaliatory discharge claim. Nordling does not fall within the exceptions
to Minnesota's rules on confidentiality,3 66 nor does an applicable exception
to the attorney-client privilege exist because Northern States did not commit
a fraudulent or illegal act.367
The above analysis shows the limits of the General Dynamics test.
Because the company's conduct did not involve the commission of criminal
or fraudulent acts, exceptions to the attorney-client privilege would not ap-
ply368 and Nordling would be unable to proceed with his case.3 69 Although
an in-house attorney may have a valid cause of action if his conduct impli-
cates a mandatory ethical obligation, the attorney-client privilege will
probably preclude retaliatory discharge suits in most other situations, even
if a nonattorney employee could successfully bring such an action.37 The
General Dynamics court attempted to provide in-house attorneys with a
viable recovery mechanism without weakening attorneys' ethical responsi-
bilities.37" '
363. See Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498, 504 (Minn. 1991)
(finding that Nordling failed to assert public policy).
364. See Gantt, 824 P.2d at 687 (requiring showing of public policy to support
retaliatory discharge action).
365. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503 (stating that attorney-client privilege does
not protect criminal and fraudulent acts).
366. See MINN. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1993) (providing list of
permissible disclosures of attorney-client confidences).
367 See sources cited supra note 338 (providing exceptions to attorney-client privilege).
368. See sources cited supra note 338 (providing exceptions to attorney-client privilege).
369. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503-04 (requiring dismissal of action if attorn-
ey would disclose confidential information and no exception to attorney-client privilege
applied).
370. See Gantt v Sentry Ins., 824 P.2d 680, 687 (allowing nonattorney's retaliatory
discharge action to succeed upon showing of employee's discharge in violation of clearly
stated public policy).
371. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 503-04 (requiring dismissal of action if attorn-
ey would disclose confidential information and no exception to attorney-client privilege
applied).
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VII The Impact of Ethical Concerns on In-House Attorneys'
Retaliatory Discharge Actions
Ethical considerations constantly surround attorneys' work.372  The
American Bar Association (ABA) attempts to instill a sense of high moral
obligation and professionalism 7 3 in attorneys314 by urging attorneys to serve
both their clients and society 37' The ABA has developed two sets of
ethical standards that states currently use to guide attorneys' behavior.376
Most states have adopted, with some changes, either the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) or the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility (Model Code).377 Although the Model Rules and the Model
372. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992) (providing ethical
standards for attorneys' conduct); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983)
(same).
373. See L. Ray Patterson, The Fundamentals of Professionalism, 45 S.C. L. REv 707,
709 (1994) (defining professionalism as using good judgment and acting with integrity in
exercise of power for clients to achieve ultimate goal of justice).
374. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. (1983) (promoting
important role of attorney m society). The preamble to the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility states:
Lawyers, as guardians of the law, play a vital role in the preservation of society.
The fulfillment of this role requires an understanding by lawyers of their
relationship with and function in our legal system. A consequent obligation of
lawyers is to maintain the highest standards of ethical conduct. Each lawyer
must find within is own conscience the touchstone against which to test the extent
to which his actions should rise above minimum standards. But in the last analysis
it is the desire for the respect and confidence of the members of his profession and
of the society which he serves that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the
highest possible degree of ethical conduct.
Id. Part VII of this Note discusses the ethical considerations of rn-house attorneys in terms
of the Model Rules and Model Code for the sake of simplicity because each jurisdiction varies
slightly The term "ethical rules" encompasses both the Model Rules and the Model Code.
375. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1992) (describing lawyers'
various obligations). But see Patterson, supra note 373, at 713 (stating that in practice lawyer
acts only in client's best interest because client pays attorney). The preamble to the Model
Rules states that a "lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and a
public citizen having special responsibility for the quality of justice." MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1992).
376. See generally MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1992) (originally adopted
in 1983); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983) (originally adopted in
1969).
377 See STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES
AND STANDARDS at x-xi (1994) (describing adoption of Model Rules of Professional Conduct
and Model Code of Professional Responsibility in various states); mfra notes 385-92 and
1047
1048 52 WASH. &LEE L. REV 991 (1995)
Code resemble one another in many respects, 38 certain differences can
require vaned courses of action.379 If an attorney violates a mandatory
provision of either the Model Rules or the Model Code, the supervising bar
association may discipline the attorney 380
Both the Model Rules and the Model Code require that the information
that an attorney learns dunng the course of representing the client remains
confidential.3"' Attorneys must preserve the confidences of clients even
accompanying text (discussing different wording of Model Rules and Model Code with
respect to permissible disclosures of client confidences).
378. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 377, at xi-xii (comparing Model Rules and
Model Code). The formats of the Model Rules and the Model Code differ significantly The
Model Code consists of three components: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary
Rules. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY prelim. statement (1983). The Can-
ons set forth general concepts for attorneys to consider. Id. Ethical Considerations represent
aspirations and objectives that attorneys should strive to achieve. Id. Disciplinary Rules
mandate a minmum level of conduct. Id. The Model Rules, on the other hand, consist of
mandatory rules followed by comments. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT scope
(1992).
379. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 377, at xi-xii (mentioning variances between
Model Rules and Model Code).
380. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT scope (1992); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY prelim. statement (1983).
381. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992) (requiring
attorneys to keep information gathered during course of attorney-client relationship con-
fidential); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1983) (same); see
also MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 4 (1992) (stating that
lawyer keeps information relating to client's representation confidential in order to encour-
age client to communicate "fully and frankly" and even to disclose "embarrassing or
legally damaging" information to attorney); ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, Formal Op. 314 (1965) (indicating that attorney must disclose confidences
of client if attorney has facts that show beyond reasonable doubt that client will commit
crime); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 216 (1941) (stating
that attorney has duty to preserve confidences and secrets of client); ABA Comm. on
Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 156 (1936) (stating that client goes
against public policy by trying to use attorney-client relationship to protect wrongdo-
ing); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155 (1936) (stating
that client's intent to commit future unlawful act is not privileged from disclosure). Model
Rule 1.6 provides:
(a) A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a
client unless the client consents after consultation, except for disclosures that
are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, and except as
stated in paragraph (b).
(b) A lawyer may reveal such informatiom to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary-
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the lawyer
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after the representation of those clients ends.3"2 The confidentiality
requirement raises serious questions about whether an in-house attorney
may pursue a wrongful discharge action under applicable ethical rules.383
Although disclosures of confidential information can occur m limited
circumstances, a question arises about whether the use of confidential
believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer m a
controversy between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a
criminal charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which
the client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992). The Model Code's provision
regarding confidentiality states:
(A) "Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client
privilege under applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gamed
m the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or
the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be
detrimental to the client.
(B) Except when permitted under DR 4-101 (C), a lawyer shall not knowingly-
(1) Reveal a confidence or secret of his client.
(2) Use a confidence or secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client.
(3) Use a confidence or secret of his client for the advantage of himself or
of a third person, unless the client consents after full disclosure.
(C) A lawyer may reveal:
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected,
but only after a full disclosure to them.
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or
required by law or court order.
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime.
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to
defend himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101 (1983).
382. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 21 (1992); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-6 (1983).
383. Seegenerally Willy v. Coastal Corp., 647 F Supp. 116 (S.D. Tex. 1986) (refusing
to allow in-house attorney's retaliatory discharge suit), rev'dfor lack offederaljunsdiction,
855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); Balla v Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (Ill. 1991) (same);
Herbster v North Am. Co. for Life & Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)
(same), appeal 'denied, 508 N.E.2d 728 (111.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Nordling
v Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991) (same); Michaelson v
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (same), aff'd, 479
N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992); McGonagle v Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989) (same).
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information in a wrongful discharge action against the attorney's former
client falls within the permissible confidentiality exceptions."8
The difference in the language of the Model Rules and the Model Code
is important. 85 Model Rule 1.6 of the Model Rules permits an attorney to
disclose confidential information in order to "establish a claim or defense
on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the
client."386 The language of ModellRule 1.6 appears to permit an attorney
to reveal client confidences in the context of a lawsuit between the attorney
and the client.387 Whenever an attorney reveals confidences, though, the
lawyer must use good judgment and must not disclose confidences
unnecessarily 388
The language of the Model Code confidentiality provision, on the other
hand, does not appear to permit the disclosure of client confidences in a
lawsuit against the attorney's former client.389 DR 4-101, the applicable
provision of the Model Code, states that an attorney may reveal "confi-
dences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful
conduct."" The Model Code does not permit the use of client confidences
384. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992) (allowing disclos-
ure with consent of client, to prevent client from committing criminal act likely to result in
substantial bodily harm or death, and to establish claim or defense on lawyer's behalf);
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1983) (allowing disclosure
with consent of client, when allowed under Disciplinary Rules, when required by law, when
mandated by court order, to prevent client from committing crime, to allow attorney to
establish defense to wrongful conduct, and to allow attorney to collect fees); see supra note
381 (providing text of Model Rule 1.6 and Model Code DR 4-101).
385. See supra note 381 (providing text of Model Rule 1.6 and Model Code DR 4-101).
386. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1992); see supra note
381 (providing text of Model Rule 1.6). The rule permits disclosure only to the extent that
the attorney believes that disclosure is necessary MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 1.6(b) (1992).
387 Id. Rule 1.6(b)(2).
388. See id. Rule 1.6(b) (allowing disclosure only to extent necessary); see also id. Rule
1.6 cmt. 18 (stating that attorney must "make every effort practicable to avoid unnecessary
disclosure of information relating to representation").
389. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1983); accord
Theodore Schenyer, Limited Tenure for Lawyers and the Structure of Lawyer-Client Rela-
tions: A Critique of the Lawyer's Proposed Right to Sue for Wrongful Discharge, 59 NEB. L.
REv. 11, 25-26 (1980) (concluding that Model Code DR 4-101 precludes wrongful discharge
suits by attorneys). The Model Code, however, specifically allows attorneys to sue former
clients for fees. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1983).
390. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1983).
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to establish a "claim" as provided by the Model Rules.391 Rather, the
Model Code provision is mostly defensive in nature, only allowing
attorneys to initiate suits against their former clients to recover fees.
When analyzing whether an attorney may disclose confidential
information at trial, the attorney-client privilege applies in addition to
applicable ethical rules such as Model Rule 1.6 or Model Code DR 4-
101. 393 The attorney-client privilege applies only during judicial proceed-
ings in which the attorney testifies or produces evidence about the client or
when the client testifies.394 Only communications occurring between the
attorney and the client395 and observations made as a consequence of those
communications receive protection from the attorney-client privilege.396
391. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1992) (allowing
attorney to use client confidences to assert claim against client); MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1983) (allowing attorney to reveal
confidences to collect fees and to defend against legal actions).
392. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1983); cf. ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 250 (1943) (discussing
permissible disclosures of client confidences). Opinion 250 states:
But the attorney may disclose information received from the client when it
becomes necessary for his own protection, as if the client should bring an action
against the attorney for negligence or misconduct, and it became necessary for the
attorney to show what his instructions were, or what was the nature of the duty
which the client expected him to perform. So if it became necessary for the
attorney to bring an action against the client, the client's privilege could not
prevent the attorney from disclosing what was essential as a means of obtaining
or defending his own rights.
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 250 (1943). Although this
opinion permits attorneys to reveal confidences when bringing a lawsuit against a former
client, the opinion was issued prior to the passage of the Model Code. See generally MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983) (originally adopted in 1969). The opinion
applied to the Model Code's predecessor, the ABA's Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted
in 1908. See GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 377, at x (providing history of ABA ethical
guidelines).
393. See MODELRuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 (1992) (distinguish-
ing attorney-client privilege from client-lawyer confidentiality under ethical rules).
394. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 954 (West 1966 & Supp. 1995) (stating that person seeking
to invoke privilege must establish that confidential communication occurred during course of
attorney-client relationship); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 5
(1992) (explaining attorney-client privilege); see also FED. R. EviD. 501 (stating that federal
privilege law is governed by principles of common law).
395. See MODEL RULES OF PkOFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 (1992) (explaining
attorney-client privilege).
396. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 954 (West 1966 & Supp. 1995) (stating that client has
privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent another from disclosing confidential information
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Attorney-client privilege also implicates the work product doctrine.3"
Client-lawyer confidentiality, on the other hand, has a broader scope. 98
Confidentiality under the ethical rules applies outside judicial proceedings
and protects not only communications between the attorney and the client,
but also any other information that the attorney gathered in the course of
representing the client."
In the context of corporate counsel wrongful discharge actions, the
client can invoke the attorney-client privilege at trial.' However, identi-
fying those representatives of the corporation to whom the privilege and the
duty of confidentiality attach poses one of the major difficulties for an in-
house attorney " Both the Model Rules and the Model Code classify an in-
house attorney's client as the corporate entity itself rather than as the indiv-
iduals who work for the corporation. ' However, because the constituents
shared between attorney and client); People v Meredith, 631 P.2d 46, 51-52 (Cal. 1981)
(finding that privilege extends to protect observations made as consequence of protected
communications, but does not protect removed or altered evidence discovered as result of
those communications); State v Olwell, 394 P.2d 681, 683 (Wash. 1964) (stating that
observations are protected by attorney-client privilege if they directly result from communica-
tion between attorney and client).
397 See FED. R. Crv. P 26(b)(3) (codifying work product doctrine). The work product
doctrine protects the "mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an
attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." Id. Discovery before
trial usually implicates the work product doctrine. Id.
398. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 (1992); see Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Pnvilege, 66 CAL. L. REV
1061, 1064-65 (1978) (stating that attorney-client privilege is narrower than client-lawyer
confidentiality).
399. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 (1992); see Hazard,
supra note 398, at 1064-65 (explaining scope of attorney-client privilege).
400. See United States v United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass.
1950) (stating that client must claim privilege); Hazard, supra note 398, at 1065 (discussing
operation of attorneyclient privilege).
401. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W WILLIAM HODES, 1 THE LAW OF LAWYERING:
A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § 1.13:102, at 387 (Supp.
1994) (stating that lawyer's first and difficult task is to identify client and to decide to whom
attorney owes duty); Corello, supra note 6, at 408 (stating difficulty of ascertaining identity
and interests of corporate client); Kim, supra note 3, at 899 (discussing difficulty of attorney
who represents entity).
402. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1992); MODEL CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1983). The applicable text of Model Rule 1.13
states:
(a) A lawyer employed or retained by an organization represents the organization
acting through its duly authorized constituents.
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within the organization communicate with the lawyer, the attorney must dis-
cern to whom within the organization the duty of confidentiality applies.' 3
The interaction between Model Rules 1.13 and 1.6 has interesting
implications for the factual scenarios of typical wrongful discharge cases.
(b) If a lawyer for an organization knows that an officer, employee or other person
associated with the organization is engaged in action, intends to act or refuses to
act in a matter related to the representation that is a violation of a legal obligation
to the organization, or a violation of law which reasonably might be imputed to
the organization, and is likely to result in substantial injury to the organization, the
lawyer shall proceed as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the
organization. In determining how to proceed, the lawyer shall give due
consideration to the seriousness of the violation and its consequences, the scope
and nature of the lawyer's representation, the responsibility in the organization
and the apparent motivation of the person involved, the policies of the organiza-
tion concerning such matters and any other relevant considerations. Any measures
taken shall be designed to minimize disruption of the organization and the risk of
revealing information relating to the representation to persons outside the
organization. Such measures may include among others:
(1) asking reconsideration of the matter;
(2) advising that a separate legal opinion on the matter be sought for presentat-
ion to appropriate authority in the organization; and
(3) referring the matter to higher authority m the organization, including if
warranted by the seriousness of the matter, referral to the highest authority that
can act in behalf of the organization as determined by applicable law.
(c) If despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b), the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon action, or a refusal
to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely to result in substantial injury
to the organization, the lawyer may resign in accordance with Rule 1.16.
(d) In dealing with an organization's directors, officers, employees, members,
shareholders or other constituents, a lawyer shall explain the identity of the client
when it is apparent that the organization's interests are adverse to those of the
constituents with whom the lawyer is dealing.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 (1992). The applicable Model Code
provision provides in part that:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his
allegiance to the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee,
representative, or other person connected with the entity. In advising the entity,
a lawyer should keep paramount its interests and his professional judgment should
not be influenced by the personal desires of any person or organization.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 5-18 (1983).
403. See MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13 cmt. 2 (1992)
(identifying constituents of organization as officers, employees, and shareholders); see also
id. Rule 1.6 (discussing confidentiality). Generally, an attorney representing an organization
must hold inviolate information learned from any of the corporation's constituents concerning
matters related to the interests of the entity Id. Rule 1.6.
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Although under the Model Rules rn-house counsel may disclose some
confidences when pursuing wrongful discharge claims, the rules do not
clearly provide for the attorney's disclosure of the client's wrongdoing to an
exterior organzation. 44 Model Rule 1.13 reads ambiguously Model Rule
1.13 does not state whether its provisions supersede those of Model Rule 1.6
or whether Model Rule 1.6 contains all of the permissible exceptions to the
confidentiality requirement.0 5 Model Rule 1.13 does not specifically allow
attorneys representing organizations to disclose the entity's wrongful
behavior to outside authorities.' If a constituent of an organization behaves
in a manner contrary to a legal obligation of the organization that will likely
bring substantial injury to the entity, then the remedial provisions of Model
Rule 1.13 will apply 407 Rather than providing specific disclosure provi-
sions, Model Rule 1.13 prescribes that "[a]ny measures taken shall be
designed to minmize disruption of the organization and the risk of revealing
information relating to the representation to persons outside the organiza-
tion."' At the same time, however, the rule allows the attorney to "proceed
as is reasonably necessary in the best interest of the organization."'
Conceivably, if a corporation's employee acts unlawfully, reporting the
misconduct might best serve the interests of the entity 410 If the violation
goes unreported to the applicable authority and the unlawful behavior
becomes imputed to the organization, the entity's reputation would be
harmed and the company's financial position would likely suffer.1
Model Rule 1.13 does provide attorneys with remedial options other
than disclosure. 412 An attorney may ask the wrongdoer to reconsider his
action or proposed action .41  A lawyer certainly should counsel employees
engaged in unlawful conduct about the impact or potential impact of their
behavior on the organization. Trying to dissuade the corporate officers from
404. See supra note 402 (providing text of Model Rule 1.13).
405. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.6, 1.13 (1992) (observing
whether one rule supersedes other).




410. See Corello, supra note 6, at 409 (stating that in-house counsel must ensure client's
compliance with applicable law to prevent harm to corporation).
411. See Corello, supra note 6, at 409 (stating that in-house counsel must ensure client's
compliance with applicable law to prevent harm to corporation).
412. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b) (1992).
413. Id. Rule 1.13(b)(1).
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their ill-advised course of conduct can be an important first step. An
attorney also can request that someone prepare a separate legal opinion
about the matter to present to an authority within the organization. 414 This
step could be helpful if the attorney that initially learned about the
wrongdoing expresses uncertainty about the illegality of the proposed
behavior. Additionally, another opinion can provide greater persuasive
force to the authority within the organization who can attempt to alleviate
the situation. However, an additional opinion also exposes another person
to potential retaliation by the organization.4"5 The final option given in
Model Rule 1.13 allows referral to a higher authority within the orgamza-
tion.416 This option can be a beneficial one, especially when the higher
authority does not know about the misconduct. However, if the higher
authority orchestrated the illegal behavior, then the organization will likely
discharge the attorney if he chooses to disclose the wrongdoing to an
outside authority If the higher authority refuses to remedy the situation,
Model Rule 1.13 suggests that attorneys may withdraw under the provisions
of Model Rule 1.16.417
Overall, Model Rule 1.13 encourages the attorney to weigh the
violation, its consequences, the involvement of the organization, and the
organization's policies about wrongdoing within the organization. 4 " The
attorney should take progressive steps to stop or to limit the effects of the
misconduct.4 9 If these steps fail, however, Model Rule 1.13 implicitly
allows attorneys to disclose the wrongdoing to an outside authority as long
as that course of action is in the best interest of the organization and the
414. Id. Rule 1.13(b)(2).
415. See Giesel, supra note 3, at 549 (stating that attorney who follows remedial
provisions of Model Rule 1.13 may alienate client and subject himself to possible discharge
or demotion).
416. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.13(b)(3) (1992).
417 Id. Rule 1.16(b)(3) (allowing permissive withdrawal when client "insists upon
pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers repugnant or imprudent"); see id. Rule
1.16(a)(1) (mandating withdrawal when representation will result m violation of Model Rules
of Professional Conduct or other law). Although Model Rule 1.13 frames the attorney's
withdrawal as permissive, seemingly in order for the provisions of Model Rule 1.13(b) to
apply, the organization must be engaged in unlawful conduct. Id. Rule 1.13. If the client
continues to break the law, the attorney must withdraw according to the provisions of Rule
1.16(a)(1). See id. Rule 1.16(a)(1) (requiring withdrawal if representation of client will result
in violation of law).
418. Id. Rule 1.13(b).
419. Id.
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attorney reveals only a mimmal amount of confidential information.42 ° If
the organization participates in illegal conduct, then the attorney must
withdraw from representation.42
In terms of bringing wrongful discharge actions under the Model
Rules, a discharged in-house attorney may disclose client confidences when
bringing an action against his former client.422 The Model Code appears
to preclude attorneys from using confidential information as evidence to
prove the allegations in their wrongful discharge actions.423 Additionally,
the attorney-client privilege will prohibit the use of communumcations
between the client and the attorney as evidence unless the corporation broke
the law 424 If the organization simply engaged in behavior with which the
attorney disapproved, then the attorney-client privilege would bar the use
of that information as evidence because the conduct was not a criminal or
a fraudulent act.4' However, the corporate attorneys m those states that
have adopted the Model Rules face another problem in bringing wrongful
discharge suits. If the organization insists upon pursuing unlawful conduct,
then the attorney must withdraw from representation of the client.426 The
employer has not discharged the attorney if the attorney withdraws from
representation.427 Thus, to pursue a retaliatory discharge action, the
attorney may face the additional evidentiary hurdle of proving that the
company constructively discharged the lawyer.428
420. See id. Rule 1.13 (urging caution when disclosing confidences); supra notes 404-11
and accompanying text (interpreting operation of Model Rule 1.13).
421. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(1) (1992).
422. Id. Rule 1.6(b)(2); see supra notes 385-92 and accompanying text (providing
analysis of differences between Model Rules and Model Code provisions on confidentiality).
423. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1983) (limiting
disclosure of client confidences in court actions to fee disputes and attorney's defense of his
own conduct); supra notes 381-92 and accompanying text (providing analysis of differences
between Model Rules and Model Code provisions on confidentiality).
424. See supra notes 396-400 and accompanying text (discussing attorney-client
privilege).
425. See MoDELRULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 cmt. 5 (1992) (explaining
attorney-client privilege); see also cases cited supra note 338 (providing exceptions to
attorney-client privilege).
426. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 1.13(c), 1.16(a)(1) (1992).
427 See Beye v Bureau of Nat'l Affairs, 477 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1984) (stating that, normally, employee who resigns is not discharged, and, therefore, has
no action for retaliatory discharge).
428. See Meyer v Brown & Root Constr. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1981)
(stating that constructive discharge occurs when employer makes employee's working
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VIII. Proposed Solutions
Whether courts should permit discharged in-house attorneys to bring
retaliatory discharge actions against their employers presents a difficult
question because numerous considerations, including serious ethical con-
cers, affect the resolution of the issue. Any adequate solution to this prob-
lem must address the potential ethical conflicts that inure to a retaliatory
discharge claim brought by a corporate attorney Professionals recognize
that they experience conflicting obligations to clients and to society 429 The
ABA Comiussion on Professionalism argues that attorneys need to place
greater emphasis on their duties to society 430 If a conflict exists between
an attorney's duty to the client and to the justice system, then the attorney's
duty to the justice system must prevail.431 Thus, an attorney should be able
tb protect the public by reporting the client's ongoing or planned wrongdo-
ing. All actors in the judicial system, however, must attempt to strike a
balance between protecting clients and society 432 Attorneys should reveal
only-those confidences necessary to protect society 433
Courts have asserted various rationales when deciding whether corpor-
ate attorneys may bring wrongful discharge actions.4" Regardless of the
environment so unreasonable that reasonable person would feel forced to resign); Neale v
Dillon, 534 F Supp. 1381, 1390, (E.D.N.Y.) (same), aft'd, 714 F.2d 116 (2d Cir. 1982);
Nolan v Cleland, 482 F Supp. 668, 672 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (stating that constructive
discharge is determined by totality of circumstances and that plaintiff must provide more
proof than his subjective opinion); Laschever v Journal Register Co., No. CV-94-0065372,
1994 WL 613427, at *3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov 1, 1994) (stating that resigning as matter of
principle fails to meet constructive discharge requirements); Beye, 477 A.2d at 1202 (stating
that constructive discharge occurs when reasonable person in employee's situation would have
felt compelled to resign).
429. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:"
A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM 29-30 (1986) [hereinafter
ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM] (discussing attorney's conflicting obligations); Carlucci
v. Piper A=raft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440, 1454 (11th Cir. 1985) (Fay, J., concurring) (same).
430. ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 429, at 29-30.
431. Id. at 30.
432. See General Dynamics Corp. v Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 498, 503 (Cal.
1994) (en banc) (providing court's emphasis on vindicating public interest without disclosing
client confidences).
433. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1992) (allowing
attorney to disclose confidences to prevent criminal act that is likely to result in death or in
substantial bodily harm); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3)
(allowing attorney to reveal client's intention to commit crime).
434. See supra parts IV, V (discussing cases in which in-house attorneys have asserted
wrongful discharge claims). See generally Willy v Coastal Corp., 647 F Supp. 116 (S.D.
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outcome of the previous cases, however, the California Supreme Court, in
General Dynamics, set forth the first structured test by which a trial court
can assess the validity of attorneys' retaliatory discharge claims.435 Al-
though the test creates some difficulties,436 other jurisdictions that begin to
allow retaliatory discharge tort actions by in-house attorneys can adjust the
General Dynamics model to address these problems.
The permissibility of retaliatory discharge actions for in-house attorn-
eys depends upon a state's ethical rules.437 States that have adopted the
confidentiality provisions of the Model Code would preclude in-house
attorneys from asserting retaliatory discharge claims unless the lawyers can
prove their cases without divulging client confidences.43 The language of
the Model Code does not permit attorneys to reveal client confidences in
order to sue their former clients for any recovery other than fees.439
Those states that have adopted the Model Rules should have greater
latitude to allow in-house counsel to bring retaliatory discharge actions."
0
The language of Model Rule 1.6 allows attorneys to bring claims against
their former clients and to reveal client confidences. 44' If courts choose to
allow these retaliatory discharge actions, states following the Model Rules
Tex. 1986) (reporting that in-house attorney sued employer and alleged wrongful dis-
charge), rev'dfor lack of federal junsdiction, 855 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1988); General
Dynamics Corp. v Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487 (Cal. 1994) (en bane) (same); Balla v
Gambro, Inc., 584 N.E.2d 104 (111. 991) (same); Herbster v North Am. Co. for Life&
Health Ins., 501 N.E.2d 343 (III. App. Ct. 1986) (same), appeal denied, 508 N.E.2d 728
(Ill.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 850 (1987); Mourad v Automobile Club Ins. Ass'n, 465
N.W.2d 395 (Mich. Ct. App.) (same), appeal denied, 478 N.W.2d 443 (Mich. 1991);
Nordling v Northern States Power Co., 478 N.W.2d 498 (Minn. 1991) (same); Michael-
son v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (same), aft'd,
479 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992); Parker v M & T Chems., Inc., 566 A.2d 215 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1989) (same); McGonagle v Union Fidelity Corp., 556 A.2d 878 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1989) (same).
435. See General Dynamics, 876 P.2d at 502-04 (announcing retaliatory discharge test
for corporate counsel).
436. See supra part VI (analyzing effectiveness of General Dynamics test).
437 See supra part VII (discussing effects of differences between Model Rules and
Model Code).
438. See Schenyer, supra note 389, at 25-26 (concluding that Model Code DR 4-101
precludes wrongful discharge suits by attorneys).
439. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(4) (1983); see supra
part VII (discussing ethical concerns surrounding retaliatory discharge actions by in-house
counsel).
440. See supra part VII (discussing differences between Model Rules and Model Code).
441. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1992).
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can decide whether to allow rn-house attorneys to divulge confidential
information or to restrict the information's use as the General Dynamics
court did. 2
California first created a public policy exception to employment at-will
in Petermann v International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 396,44 and
a majority of jurisdictions followed suit.' The General Dynamics decision
could have a similar effect on the allowance of in-house counsel retaliatory
discharge actions." 5 For example, on August 1, 1995, in GTE Products
Corp. v Stewart,446 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts followed
the General Dynamics decision and agreed to recognize retaliatory
discharge actions brought by in-house attorneys." 7 As other jurisdictions
442. See General Dynamics Corp. v. Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503-04 (Cal. 1994)
(allowing revelation of confidential communications only if information falls within exception
to attorney-client privilege).
443. 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
444. See supra note 76 (listing jurisdictions that recognize public policy exception to
employment at-will rule).
445. See GTE Prods. Corp. v. Stewart, No. 06749, 1995 WL 457297, at *3 (Mass. Aug.
1, 1995) (following General Dynamics decision and recognizing retaliatory discharge as valid
cause of action for dismissed in-house counsel). The Stewart decision occurred after the
completion of this Note. Therefore, the author could not provide a thorough analysis of the
case. See infra note 447 (providing factual discussion of Stewart).
446. No. 06749, 1995 WL 457297 (Mass. Aug. 1, 1995).
447 See GTE Prods. Corp. v Stewart, No. 06749, 1995 WL 457297, at *3-4 (Mass.
Aug. 1, 1995) (allowing dismissed in-house attorneys to bring wrongful discharge actions
under limited circumstances). In Stewart, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
considered whether a discharged in-house attorney could proceed with a retaliatory discharge
action or whether ethical considerations prohibited the cause of action. Id. at *2. Jefferson
Davis Stewart, I, the plaintiff, began working for GTE Products Corporation (GTE) in 1980
as an attorney in GTE's electrical equipment group. Id. at *1. Six years later, GTE
promoted Stewart to general counsel of GTE's lighting businesses. Id. As general counsel
to the lighting businesses, Stewart suggested to the corporate officers and officials that GTE
take an aggressive approach toward consumer safety. Id. Additionally, Stewart advised GTE
that to comply with federal regulations, the company needed to treat fluorescent and
incandescent light bulbs as hazardous waste when disposing of them. Id. According to
Stewart, GTE disregarded his suggestions. Id. Throughout his employment at GTE, Stewart
consistently had received high performance evaluations. Id. However, in 1991, Stewart's
supervisor, Rolfe Trevisan, changed Stewart's confidential promotability rating to the lowest
level. Id. Subsequently, Trevisan informed Stewart that an officer was dissatisfied with
Stewart's performance and that unless Stewart's attitude improved, his job was at risk. Id.
at *2. Stewart believed that GTE was preparing to discharge him. Id. Therefore, Stewart
resigned on August 8, 1991. Id. Trevisan unsuccessfully attempted to persuade Stewart to
return to work. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court first decided whether Stewart's status as an
in-house attorney precluded his action for wrongful discharge. Id. The court evaluated
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begin to allow corporate counsel to bring retaliatory discharge actions,
those courts should follow California's lead in respecting client confidenti-
ality 448 Confidentiality breeds trust in the judicial system and helps it
function. 449 If courts freely permit discharged attorneys to disclose
confidential client matters, citizens' trust in the judicial system will
decline. 4 °  Additionally, even if courts in states that have adopted the
Model Rules permit attorneys to use information gathered during the course
of representing the client, the court may still exclude the evidence when the
client invokes the attorney-client pnvilege.4
wrongful discharge cases brought by in-house attorneys in other jurisdictions. Id. at *2-3.
The Stewart court elected to follow the approach set forth in General Dynamics. Id. at *3.
The court stated that an in-house attorney should not lack protection from wrongful discharge
solely because of his status as an attorney Id. Rather, the court agreed with the General
Dynamics court that the availability of legal recourse against employers will help in-house
attorneys better serve the public interest by upholding ethical duties. Id. The court
emphasized that it would recognize a retaliatory discharge action brought by an in-house
attorney only in very narrow circumstances. Id. at *4. In Massachusetts, a court will
recognize an in-house attorney's claim for wrongful discharge only if it depends on
"(1) explicit and unequivocal statutory or ethical norms (2) which embody policies of
importance to the public at large in the circumstances of the particular case, and (3) the claim
can be proved without any violation of the attorney's obligation to respect client confidences
and secrets." Id. Even if a nonattorney employee in the same circumstances could bring a
wrongful discharge action, an in-house attorney may proceed only if the lawyer will not
violate attorney-client confidentiality Id. After addressing this threshold issue, the court
examined whether the lower court properly granted summary judgment to GTE. Id. Because
Stewart did not allege that GTE fired him, Stewart needed to prove that GTE constructively
discharged him from his position as general counsel. Id. at *5. The court concluded that as
a matter of law, Stewart failed to provide sufficient proof of constructive discharge. Id.
Although the Supreme Judicial Court differed with the district court by agreeing to recognize
wrongful discharge actions brought by in-house counsel, the court affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment to GTE because no triable issue of fact existed with regard to the
question of constructive discharge. Id. at *6.
448. See id. at *4 (allowing in-house attorneys to bring wrongful discharge actions in
only limited circumstances in which attorneys would not reveal client confidences).
449 See MODEL RuLES OF PROFFSSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. (1992) (stating that "a lawyer
can be sure that preserving client confidences ordinarily serves the public interest because
people are more likely to seek legal advice, and thereby heed their legal obligations, when
they know their communications will be private").
450. See id. (stating that confidentiality between attorney and client promotes greater
confidence in judicial system).
451. See United States v United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass.
1950) (stating that client must claim attorney-client privilege); Hazard, supra note 398, at
1065 (stating that if client claims attorney-client privilege, communications between attorney
and client are protected unless subject to exception).
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In order to clarify the proper course of action that states should take
with regard to allowing the use of client confidences in retaliatory discharge
actions, the ABA needs to amend Model Rule 1.13 specifically to address
this issue.452 An amended section could state:
(c) If despite the lawyer's efforts in accordance with paragraph (b) the
lughest authority that can act on behalf of the organization insists upon
action, or a refusal to act, that is clearly a violation of law and is likely
to result in substantial injury to the organization,
(1) the lawyer may report the misconduct to an outside authority;
(2) the lawyer must withdraw in accordance with Rule 1.16 if the
lawyer's continued representation of the client will result in a violation
of the rules of professional conduct or other law; or
(3) the lawyer may withdraw in accordaice with the provisions of
Rule 1.16(b).453
This amendment would help clarify an attorney's ability to report wrongdo-
ing to outside authorities in order to support public policy 4" Additionally,
the amended rule would provide greater clarity in identifying when an
attorney must withdraw from representation as opposed to when an attorney
may withdraw 411
Additionally, ABA comments to Model Rule 1.6 that address the
allowable scope of asserting claims against former clients could provide
immense guidance to attorneys following the ethics rules and to courts
attempting to apply the rules. Amending Model Rule 1.6 is also an option.
One possible amendment to Model Rule 1.6 would address permissible
disclosures by attorneys representing organizations and would add a linuta-
tion on the disclosure of client confidences in actions against former clients.
The new section would read:
452. -Additionally, the ABA should amend the Model Code. Currently, the Model Code
fails to provide a disciplinary rule that addresses the representation of an organization.
Although EC 5-18 applies to the situation, an Ethical Consideration is not mandatory m
character. See supra note 311 (distinguishing mandatory Disciplinary Rules and aspirational
Ethical Considerations). States could individually amend their governing ethical rules without
waiting for the ABA to act.
453. See supra note 402 (providing text of current Rule 1.13); see also Kim, supra note
3, at 908 (stating that current Model Rule 1.13 fails to adequately address prevention of
illegal corporate acts); supra part VII (discussing ambiguity of current Rule 1.13).
454. See supra notes 405-12 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity of current
Model Rule 1.13).
455. See supra notes 405-12 and accompanying text (discussing ambiguity of current
Model Rule 1.13).
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(b) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary-
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodi-
ly harm;
(2) to prevent an organizational client from committing a viola-
tion of law that is likely to result in substantial injury to the organiza-
tion;
(3) to protect the public's health and well-being from an orgam-
zational client's wrongful acts;
(4) to establish a defense on behalf of the lawyer in a contro-
versy between the lawyer and the client;
(5) to establish a defense to a crimnal charge or civil claim
against the lawyer based upon conduct m which the client was in-
volved;
(6) to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the
lawyer's representation of the client; or
(7) to collect any fee owed from the client.
(c) A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent permitted
by the applicable attorney-client evidentiary privilege
(1) to establish a claim, other than for fees, against the client.4"6
The proposed amendment to Model Rule 1.6 would eliminate potential
conflicts with Model Rule 1.13 and provide greater clarity about the use of
client confidences when asserting claims against former clients.457 By
allowing the disclosure of client confidences when an exception to the
attorney-client privilege applies, those clients committing crimes or fraud
could not hide behind the pnvilege. 8  However, for lesser forms of
wrongdoing, retaliatory discharge plaintiffs must rely on proof outside of
client-lawyer confidences.4 59 Overall, courts must carefully guard client
confidences and allow attorneys to reveal those confidences only in rare
situations.
456. See supra note 381 (providing text of current Model Rule 1.6); see also supra part
VII (discussing relation of Model Rule 1.6 and Model Rule 1.13).
457 See supra notes 386-88 and accompanying text (discussing right of attorney to assert
claim against former client).
458. See Clark v United States 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (stating that privilege takes flight
when it is abused).
459. See General Dynamics Corp. v Superior Court, 876 P.2d 487, 503-04 (1994) (en
banc) (stating that court should dismiss action if attorney-client privilege does not allow
disclosure of information).
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IX. Conclusion
Protecting society is an important goal that attorneys must strive to
achieve. 46 However, lawyers also must remain conscious of the ethical
duty that they owe to their clients.46' In the context of retaliatory discharge
actions, courts must attempt to balance these two responsibilities. 462 The
General Dynamics test affords in-house attorneys discharged for upholding
mandatory ethical obligations a reasonable remedy that protects both socie-
ty and the confidences of the client. Courts should not extend further the
retaliatory discharge remedy and jeopardize client confidences. Rather, the
state legislatures must consider revising the governng ethucal rules to
eliminate ambiguity and to provide specific direction to corporate counsel
dealing with potential ethical conflicts.463
460. See ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONALISM, supra note 429, at 15 (recommending that
attorneys preserve and develop devotion to public interest).
461. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1992) (requiring attor-
neys to preserve client confidences); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
4-101 (1983) (same).
462. See- supra parts IV, V (surveying retaliatory discharge cases brought by in-house
attorneys in which courts attempted to balance attorneys' ethical duties with their representa-
tion of clients).
463. See supra part VIII (offering amendments to Model Rules).
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